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ABSTRACT
The thesis consists of three loosely connected
essays. Each paper is a theoretical study of some
form of long-term commitment made'by economic agents.
The goal is to relate the derived micro-level decision
models to macroeconomic phenomena, especially the
business cycle.
Chapter 1 analyzes the problem of making irrever-
sible investment decisions when there is uncertainty
about the true parameters of the stochastic economy.
It is shown that increased uncertainty provides an
incentive to defer such investments in order to wait
for new information. Uncertainty and the volatility
of investment demand are connected at the aggregate
level.
In Chapter 2 we look at the commitment of resour-
2
ces to specific sectors of the economy. It is assumed
that: relative sectoral productivities vary over time,
and that it is costly to transfer resources between
sectors. In both planning and market economy contexts,
we show that dynamic considerations can make periods
of unemployment and excess capacity part of an effi-
cient growth path.
Chapter 3 studies labor contracting in an en-
vironment with capital and a quasi-fixed labor force.
We argue that for exogenous reasons real labor con-
tracts may be incomplete; i.e., unable to contain
certain types of provisions. The resulting second-
best: contracts may lead to situations of apparent
(but only apparent) labor market disequilibrium. The
contracting model provides a framework for analyzing
numerous sources of unemployment.
Thesis Supervisor: Stanley Fischer
Professor of Economics
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CHAPTER ONE
ON THE TIMING OF IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENTS
Introduction
Economic theorists are usually willing to assume the
existence of a great deal of flexibility in the economy.
Factors are mobile, prices shift readily, techniques of
production are changed, the capital stock is as easily
decreases as increased. Observation suggests that, how-
ever reasonable the assumption of flexibility may be in
the long run, it is an increasingly bad approximation as
the horizon under consideration shortens. Analysis of
the business cycle -- a short-to-medium term phenomenon
-- needs to recognize the difficulty the economy may
have in adjusting to new events. Slow or incomplete
adjustment is not the antithesis of rational economic be-
havior, but a result of the economic necessity of making
long-term commitments under incomplete information. When
new information arrives, agents who have made commitments
cannot react flexibly; those who have not committed them-
selves may wait to find out the long-term implications
before they act.
With the ultimate goal of analyzing the economy's
short-run response to new information, this paper studies
a particular form of commitment under uncertainty: the
making of durable, irreversible investments. In this
class we include almost any purchase of producers' or
consumers' durables, structures, or investment in human
7
capital. Indeed, given that a real investment is durable,
the qualifier "irreversible" is hardly necessary (viz.,
the Second Law of Thermodynamics). Once a machine tool
is made, for instance, it cannot be transformed into
anything very unlike a machine tool without prohibitive
loss of economic value -- this is what we mean by irre-
versibility. An individual can sell his machine tool,
but society as a whole is still committed to it; this
fact is reflected in the price the seller can get. More-
over, some investments -- for example, in human capital
-- are irreversible even for the individual.
The addition of the assumption of irreversibility,
in combination with the assumptions of uncertainty and
investible resource scarcity, has interesting implications
for investment theory. Irreversibility creates an a-
symmetry, not usually accounted for in the theory, be-
tween the acts of investing and not-investing. If an
agent invests, and new information reveals that he should
not have, then he cannot undo his mistake; his loss ac-
crues over the life of the investment. If an agent fails
to invest, when he should have, he can still make up most
of the loss by investing in the next period. Willingness
to invest in a given period depends not only upon risk-
discounted returns but on the rate of arrival of new
information. When there is a high "information poten-
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tial" (usually, when the environment is in a state of flux
or uncertainty), a wait-and-see approach is most profit-
able and investment is low. When certainty about the
economy is high, and there does not seem to be much to
be learned by waiting, investors are relatively more will-
ing. The timing of investment is seen to be an important
part of the decision problem. It is argued that the fact
of irreversibility helps explain the volatility of durable
purchases over the cycle.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section
I sets up the irreversible investment problem and inter-
prets the solution conditions. The concepts of the
asymmetry in the investment decision and information
potential are introduced and motivated.
Section II develops the model for the case where
agents have Dirichlet priors and the underlying sto-
chastic structure is stationary. In this example there
is a natural exact measure of information potential, and
we verify that it belongs in the desired capital stock
equation, along with return.
Section III is a heuristic look at the case where
the stochastic structure is nonstationary. It is argued
that in that situation information potential may increase
or decrease, potentially leading to volatility of invest-
ment demand.
An application is presented in Section IV. We con-
sider investment in an energy-importing economy faced with
an energy cartel of uncertain duration.
Section V concludes.
I. Irreversible Investment: Statement of the Problem
This section studies the T-period, stochastic de-
cision problem of an agent who must distribute his
wealth between liquid and illiquid (irreversible) assets.
We employ a simple model that reduces the problem to a
choice of optimal stock levels. Our goals are to moti-
vate the idea of an asymmetry in the investment decision
caused by irreversibility and to develop tools used in
the later sections.
A basic assumption to be used throughout is that
the agent's stock of wealth, W, is an exogenously-given,
nondecreasing function of time. This assumption plays
two roles: 1) it permits separation of the asset choice
problem and the life-cycle savings problem; and 2) it
ensures that the agent faces a less-than-perfectly elastic
supply of investible resources in each period. The first
of these allows great simplification but has no essential
bearing on the argument. Some form of (2), however, must
be assumed. If the supply of investible resources is
perfectly elastic, then the fact of irreversibility does
not affect the investment decision.
The model is as follows. An agent holds a given
quantity Wt of liquid wealth at the beginning of period
t. The agent observes the state of nature in time t,
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which determines the current returns to holdings (and
possibly also revises the agent's priors on future
states of nature). After observing the state, the agent
has the option to convert all or part of his liquid hold-
ings into one or more of k available illiquid assets. He
does this with the knowledge that an illiquid asset can-
not be reconverted to liquid form or to an alternate non-
liquid asset. We assume a fixed rate of transformation
between liquid and nonliquid assets; one unit of liquid
wealth always exchanges for one unit of illiquid. All
assets are perfectly divisible, durable, and available
in any quantity.
Once the agent has made his portfolio choice, he
receives his current return. The return takes the form
of a quantity of a homogeneous, perishable consumption
good. The level of return is a function of the agent's
holdings of the k+l assets and the state of nature
prevailing in t. We write the aggregate return function
R(-) as
(1.1) R(Klt,K2t',..'.,K k t) = r0(Wt -EKit) +
rl(Klt,St) + ... + rk(KktSt )
where
Kit = holdings of the i-th illiquid asset
in t
12
Wt - Kit = holdings of liquid wealth in t
it
st = the observed state of nature in t
and the individual return functions r i() are increasing
and concave in holdings. Note that there is a return on
liquid holdings, which is assumed not to depend on st.
For simplicity of exposition, and for this section only,
we make the assumption that r(O) equals infinity, i = 0,
1,...,k, so that the agent always wishes to hold some of
each asset. After the return is received, a new period
begins, with a new state of nature. The agent must make
the new portfolio choice; this he does subject to the
constraint that he cannot reduce his holdings of an
illiquid asset and that his total holdings cannot ex-
ceed Wt+l
.
This process is repeated until the terminal
period T is reached.
The agent's objective is to maximize the expected
utility of his returns over the horizon. In the usual
way, expected utility will be taken to be separable and
concave in the quantity of the consumption good consumed
in each period and state. With these assumptions, and
given both the wealth and return functions, we can con-
veniently write the decision problem in period t as
T
(1.2) max X Et U (KT K2T , KkT ST ){K t} =t l ' '' k 'it
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subject to KiT Ki--l -1 
T = t,t+l,...,T
where is the discount factor, KiT is the holding of
the i-th illiquid asset in period T, and expectations
are with respect to period t. Here we have used our
knowledge of the return functions and the T-th period
wealth constraint to write the utility functions directly
in terms of the holdings of illiquid assets. For values
of K and K not subject to inequality constraints, we
can use our previous curvature assumptions to write, for
a given state of nature
(1.3a) aU/aK L 0 
all i,j,T
(1.3b) a2 U/aKi aK. < 0
Condition (1.3b) is interpreted as follows. To increase
his holdings of Ki, the agent must run down his stock
of liquid wealth. If he wishes to increase K as well,
it must be done out of liquid wealth that has been re-
duced and therefore has a higher marginal opportunity
cost (due to the concavity of r0 (-) ). Thus an increase
in one illiquid holding reduces the net marginal consump-
tion return, and hence the marginal utility, of an increase
in an alternate holding.
We have not said anything about how the agent forms
his expectations. In the sequel we will employ some
specific models. For the present let us assume that
14
there are thought to be a finite number of possible
states in each period (the set of states possibly dif-
fering from period to period); and that the agent has
set up a subjective "probability tree" giving transition
probabilities at each stage as a function of the history
of states.
The solution technique for this type of problem
is stochastic dynamic programming. We define the se-
quence of value functions
(1.4) Vt (O',st) = max {U(Kt,st) +
Kt
BY P(St+lISt) t+l(Kt,(stst+l))}
J
max {U(Kt+lSt+l) +
t+lK t
j t+2( t+l)) Vt+2(Kt+l'(t'' I'St+2J"Ps, 
VT(KT-1'(st, ST )) = max U(KT,sT)
KTKT1
where K is the k-vector of illiquid asset holdings in
period T.
Thus, VT (K
_
1 (st ... , s T)) represents the maximum
15
Vtl(Kt(st)t+))=
expected utility attainable from periods T to T, given
inherited illiquid stocks KT _1 and history (st,... ,sT).
For a fully specified problem the VT can be evaluated
by backward recursion over all possible sequences
(sTsT+l*... ,'ST) Optimal asset holdings for a given
time-state node and inherited holdings are found by
solving for K satisfying the k conditions
(1.5) · ( s T) + j P(+
aK. T' T+l iT
IT
i = 1,2,...,k
where XiT is the (positive) Lagrange multiplier corre-
sponding to the constraint Ki. K For this to
a maximum it is sufficient to demonstrate that V(.) is
concave in K. This is shown in an appendix.
In principle, at least, a computer could use the
above approach to produce numerical solutions of fully-
specified problems. In practice, the "curse of dimen-
sionality" would prohibit the solution of large problems,
especially if there were many possible states of nature
in each period. Our problem is still too general for
explicit solution of either the numerical or analytic
variety. However we can, at this stage, use the dynamic
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programming concept to find some characterizations of the
solution.
Let us return to the decision problem in period t.
There are no inherited illiquid stocks at this point;
we have already assumed that the non-negativity con-
straints on desired stocks are not binding. Then the
agent's optimal holdings of the k illiquid assets after
observing st are given by the simultaneous solution of
the k equations
(1.6) Du _ 3(1.6) aK (KtSt) + Z P(st+lISt)
it j
Dv -*
aK (Kts +) =
Kit t+
i = 1,2,...,k
Let us interpret these conditions. The first term of the
left-hand side sum in the i-th equation is the agent's
net marginal utility, in the current period, from ex-
panding his holdings of the i-th asset by an additional
unit. The second term is the marginal effect of increased
current holdings of Ki on the value function. Note that
this term is always less than or equal to zero. This fol-
lows from the fact that the higher the inherited levels
of illiquid holdings, the more restricted is the scope of
portfolio choice in subsequent periods. Since the maximum
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over a set is always at least as large as the maximum
over a subset of that set, we have the implication that
aV/aKi . 0, always.
aV/aKi can be interpreted as (the negative of)
"expected marginal regret" induced by a current-period
increase in holdings of Ki. Thus the optimal holdings,
as given by (1.6), equate the current marginal return of
each asset and the expected marginal losses arising from
the restriction of the future choice set. Note also
that aV/aKi(Kt,st+l) is strictly equal to zero for values
of st+ in which desired holdings of Ki will exceed those
planned in period t. For values of st+ in which Ki
appears less attractive than it did in period t, the
agent experiences regret (aV/aKi is strictly less than
zero).
Examination of (1.6) allows us to verify some well-
known conclusions about illiquid investment. First, in
the complementary problem in which the k assets are
perfectly liquid, optimization requires only the maxim-
ization of current-period utility; i.e., in (1.6) the
second term is always equal to zero in the liquid case.
Since in the illiquid case the second term is generally
less than zero, we have aU/aKi (Kt -il liquid) _ U/aKi(K t,
liquid). That is, everything else being equal, agents
18
will hold less of an asset if it is illiquid. (This is the
basic point of recent papers on environmental preservation
and irreversibility. See Arrow-Fisher (1974)). Second,
all else equal, the more agents discount the future,
the more willing they are to hold illiquid assets. (This
does not follow directly from (1.6), since the discount
factor implicitly appears also in V(.); however, it can
be shown by induction.) Finally, the higher their
prior probability on the occurrence of future states in
which they will regret their illiquid investments (i.e.,
those future states in which desired illiquid stocks are
less than those currently planned), the less the agents
will invest in illiquid stocks.
We can also use (1.6) to demonstrate an asymmetry
between the acts of investing and not-investing which
occurs because of irreversibility. The regret terms in
that first-order condition, aV/aKi(Kt ,st+ l), are nonzero
only for states st+l which are bad for holding Ki,
relative to the decision period. (In 'bad' states
st+l the optimal unrestricted holding of Ki is strictly
less than in the decision period.) 'Good' states st+l,
no matter how good, exert no counterbalancing effect in
the current investment decision. This reflects the fact
that underinvestment is remediable under uncertainty;
19
errors in this direction can be made up as soon as new
information is received. Overinvestment is not remediable
and induces permanent regret.
Consider this thought experiment. Suppose that,
from an initial equilibrium position, the agent suddenly
decided that those period t+l states which he had thought
were good for investment Ki are really (much) 'better';
but that those period t+l states which were previously
thought to be bad are actually (a little) 'worse' (i.e.,
they induce more regret at the original level of in-
vestment in Ki). This change of beliefs could be done
in such a way that the expected value of the holding of
Ki ('q', we might call it) is the same or even higher
than originally. Nevertheless, due to (1.6) and the
asymmetry, with the new set of beliefs the optimizing
agent unambiguously reduces planned investment in Ki,
relative to the original holding.
This thought experiment goes through even when we
drop the assumption that investments are immediately
realized as capital. The case of a nonzero gestation
period is treated in Appendix 2.
In this example there has been an increase in what
we shall call the system's "information potential", which
we shall define heuristically as the average expected
20
impact of new observations on the agent's beliefs. The
example suggests that when information potential is high,
there is an incentive for investors to wait for the new
information. This leads to a decrease in current invest-
ment. This idea is developed in the subsequent sections,
under the assumption that beliefs can be summarized by
a particularly convenient Bayesian distribution.
This heuristic definition cannot always be made precise.
For the example in Section II we find a natural exact
measure of information potential. In Sections III and IV
this concept's role is basically expositional.
21
II. A Dirichlet Example: Stationary Case
In this and the next section we develop an extended
example that illustrates our model of investment. This
section considers the case where the underlying structure
which generates observed returns, though not perfectly
known, is thought to be stationary over time. Thus the
investor's information about his environment can in-
crease but never decrease.
Suppose that there are a finite number of discrete
states of nature possible, and that the probability of a
state occurring in a given period is constant and in-
dependent of the history of states. To have perfect
knowledge of the (stationary) underlying structure in
this case is to know the parameters of the multinomial
distribution from which the state-outcomes are drawn in
each period. We shall assume that the true distribution
is not known, but that the agent has a prior distribution
over the multinomial parameters.
We shall take the agent's priors to be in the form
of a Dirichlet distribution. The Dirichlet is an n-para-
meter distribution defined over the (n-l)-simplex,
For a derivation of the Dirichlet's properties, the reader
should consult DeGroot (1970) or Murphy (1965). For an
interesting application of this family in the'theory of
search,' see Rothschild (1974).
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where n is the number of variables in the joint distri-
bution; i.e., it is defined only for sets of n random
variables that are positive and sum to one. Thus it is
an appropriate prior over the parameters of an n-nomial
density.
The Dirichlet has a number of useful properties,
notably that is its own posterior density and that it
is statistically consistent as an estimator for the
true density. We employ it here because its use for
inference implies a very simple belief-updating rule.
The beliefs about the environment of an agent with a
Dirichlet prior can be described at time t by an n-vec-
tor, (alt,a2t,... ,ant) corresponding to the parameters
n
of his prior. Define rt = ait. Then 1) the agent's
i=l
prior probability (at t) on the occurrence of state j
is given by ajt/rt. 2) The posterior probability is
a.t + h.(t. t+d)
given by , where hj(t,t+d) is the
rt+ d
number of times state j is observed in the interval
(t,t+d). To restate the belief-updating rule simply:
when a new state is observed, increase the parameter
corresponding to that state by one. Leave the other
parameters unchanged. The updated probability of a given
state is just the ratio of the updated parameter corre-
sponding to that state to the sum of parameters.
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Notice that rt, the sum of Dirichlet parameters in
time t, is a natural (inverse) measure of the information
potential of the environment. When rt is small, the
effect of a new observation on the agent's priors is
large. When rt is large (infinity, in the limit), the
effect of a new observation on priors is relatively small
(zero, in the limit). Thus we will be especially inter-
ested to see how changes in r, return probabilities held
constant, affect investment behavior.
The example we develop is the simplest possible. We
consider a fixed-wealth investor who can choose between
only two assets, one liquid and one illiquid (irreversible).
As before, there is a T-period horizon, but now there
are only two states. In state 1, the marginal returns to
the illiquid asset, given holdings, are "high"; in state
2 the returns to the illiquid asset are "low". Given
holdings, the return to the liquid asset is the same in
both states.
The agent has Dirichlet priors on the underlying bi-
nomial distribution. His beliefs at any time t are com-
pletely characterized by the pair (at,rt). The agent's
prior probability that state 1 will occur in t+l is given
by at/rt. If state 1 does occur in t+l, the revised priors
are (at+ = at + 1; rt+ = rt + 1). Similarly, the agent's
probability for state 2 occurring in t+l is 1 - at/rt =
24
(rt - at)/rt . If state 2 does occur in t+l, priors are
revised by (at+ = at; rt+l = r t + 1).
With this setup we can show the following proposition:
Proposition: Consider the problem of choosing an (un-
restricted) portfolio (Kt,W-Kt) to maximize expected util-
T
ity i t EU(K T s), K > K 1, where U/aK(K,s=l) >
T=t
aU/3K(K,s=2), and the agent's prior at time t is Diri-
chlet with parameters (atrt-at). Define xt = at/rt.
Then, letting T + A, there exists a rule for desired
(unrestricted) illiquid holdings of the form K = K (x,r),
such that K /3x > 0, and aK /ar > 0.
Proof: (The proof is expository. The reader not inter-
ested in details may still wish to read part 1).
The existence of the rule is tantamount to the
existence of a solution to the dynamic programming prob-
lem. This existence must usually be assumed, and we do
so here. Conditional on existence we prove the two
derivative properties. This is done by induction.
1) We show the derivative properties of the rule
for period T-2. (In T the decision is trivial; in T-1
the second property holds with equality rather than in-
equality.) Begin by defining two quantities, Kmax and
K .min
(2.1) K = max(W,K), where is such thatmax
25
aU
(K,s=l) = 0
(2.2) Kmin = min(O,K), where K is such that
3K (K,s=2) = 0
K and Kmin are respectively the largest and smallestmax min
quantities of the illiquid asset the agent could feasibly
and rationally choose. Kmax will be held when state 1
is thought to prevail forever. Kmin will be held, or at
least desired, whenever state 2 occurs.
We want a defining expression for KT_2, the opti-
mal unrestricted holding in T-2. (The decision maker
will then actually hold max(KT 2,KT 3) in T-2). If
ST-2 = 2 (the "bad" state), KT-2 = Kmin . So we only
consider ST2 = 1. From the point of view of T-2, the
future then looks like Figure 1, where (a,r) are the
Dirichlet parameters in T-2.
The level parts of the figure describe the two
possible future states in T-1 (denumerated 1 and 4),
and the four possible states in T (2,3,5,6), plus the
corresponding desired (unrestricted) holdings. Note that
in any situation where s = 2 (states 3,4,6), the desired
holding is K; there is no desire to hold more, since
aU/aK(Kmin,s=2) = 0, and no desire to hold less, since a
26
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holding of K min will never restrict future decisions.
When sT = 1, (states 2 and 5) the desired holding is
K ; again, U/aK(K s=l) = 0,,and, as T is the lastmax max'
period, there are no future decisions to worry about.
Finally, KT_1 in state 1 is given by the equation
aU * r - aU *(2.3) aK (KT_,S=l) + r l aK (KT 'S= 2) = 0
Written along the sloped parts of the figures are the
subjective transition probabilities, in terms of the
Dirichlet parameters from T-2.
KT_2 is to be found at the point where the marginal
current gains from increasing KT 2 are just offset by
expected losses due to the restriction of future choice
sets. We must determine the future states in which a
small change in KT_2 around its optimum will constrain
choice. We show first that KT 1 > K T2' always. Both
have the same current return schedule, and they impose
identical restrictions when an unfavorable state (s = 2)
occurs in the subsequent period. But 1) as the figure
shows, the probability of a subsequent unfavorable state
is greater when picking KT 2 than when picking (KT 1 I sTl=l),
and 2) KT 2 may impose restrictions in other subsequent
states, while (KTIllSTl=l) obviously does not. We con-
clude KT 1 KT_2. Since KT_1 > KT_, small changes
in KT 2 around its optimum can cause no restriction
in any state in the upper
28
branch of the figure -- states 1, 2, or 3 KT 2 obviously
also causes no restriction in state 5, where the desired
holding is Kma. Increases in KT 2 are subsequently
costly only in states 4 and 6, which have desired holdings
equal to Kmin. The probability of state 4 is (r-a)/r; the
probability of state 6 is (rA)( r+l) KT_2 is thus
given by:
(2.4) a (KT2 S+1) + ()(1 + frl-a)
'K (K-2's=2) = 0
(So we have been able to write down an explicit rule
for choice of K in period T-2).
Set x = a/r and use (2.4) to define KT_2(x,r). Im-
plicit differentiation yields
d. aiu ,.s=2)(2.5) aT 2
l2u ( 2 's= l) + d2 a2U ( T2 s= 2 )
aK2 K2 ,s=
which is greater than zero because
dl = (l+B(l-xr)) + 2(1-x) > 0
d2= (-x) (+(1-xr)) > 
aU/aK(KT _2 ,s=2) < for KT-2 > Kmin, and a2U/aK 2 < . We
also get
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KT-2 d3 aK (KT-2s= 2 )
(2.6) a =
U (KT 2 ,s=l) + d2 a U (KT s=2)
DK2 T-2 ' K2 -2
which is also greater than zero because
d= 2(l1-x) x (r+l)-2 > .
This shows the rule for T-2. Note that the property
aKT2 > 0 is true because 1) the asymmetry between invest-
ing and not-investing means agents worry only about how
bad things can get, not how good things can get, and 2)
when r is low, things can get bad faster than when r is
high. (They can also get good faster, but this is irrele-
vant.)
2) We now make the inductive step. Assume the
existence of the rule, with properties K /x > 0,
aK /r > 0, for periods t+l, t+2,...,T.
Define the value function in period T as V(K,xT,rT),
where K is inherited irreversible capital and (xT,rT)
summarizes current beliefs.
In period t we suppose st = 1, as usual. Then
DU K " V *(2.7) aU (K (xtrt) st=l) + V (K (xtrt)xtrt)
= 0 .
30
Differentiating by xt and then by rt yields
2V
(2.8) aK -Kx
r a2U a2V
+B
aK2 aK2
D2V
aK aK _r(2.9)K Kr
r 2U + a2v
aK 2 aK 2
Our problem is reduced to showing 2V/aKx > 0 and
a2V/aKar > 0 at the optimum points. We offer a heuristic
demonstration (which may be formalized), and then an
algebraic one.
Recall that -V/aK(K,x,r) measures the marginal
regret induced by an increase in current irreversible
holdings K. To show a2V/3K3x > 0 and 2V/ K3r > 0 we
need to show that a small increase in either x or r
in the agent's priors reduces the expected regret
associated with a given holding K. For a given (x,r),
consider the set of future consequences S(K) in which
the agent will be constrained away from his optimal
holdings because of the irreversibility of K. Let 
be a sequence (St+lSt+2 *,...,s T). By definition, K(s T)
< Kt, all STES(K). Also, for any TS S(K), hl(t+l,T)/(T-t)
< x. (This follows from the inductive hypothesis K /ax
> 0. Since K(s) < Kt, the fraction of good states
observed between t+l and T must be less than x.)
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A small increase in x or r could affect the regret
level in three ways: by changing the set S(K), by chang-
ing the current loss due to constraint experienced in
each sequence in S(K), and by changing the prior prob-
abilities on those unfavorable sequences. 1) By the
inductive hypotheses and the definition of S(K), a
small increase in x or r can remove sequences from
S(K) but cannot add any. 2) The loss due to constraint
in each sequence in S(K) depends only on K and the
states in the sequence, and therefore is unaffected
by changes in x and r. 3) Define xT(s T ) to be the
agent's prior probability of a good state occurring,
given history s S(K). Then XT(sT) = (xr + h (t+ l T))/
(r + T - t). It is easy to show that axT/ax > 0, and
axT/ar > 0. Thus a small increase in x or r always
increases the probability of a more favorable sequence
relative to a less favorable one. We conclude that
increases in x or r reduce marginal regret; that is,
a2V/aKax > 0, a2V/aKar > 0.
Algebraically we can in fact show thata 2V/aKax
anda2V/aKar are greater than zero not just for K around
the optimum, but for any K such that K . < K < K
min max
Consider the quantitya2V/aKax in period T-2. Our
example in part 1 of this proof already has showna2V/MKDx
> 0 for K such that Ki n < K < KT_ 1. If K is such that
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KT_1 < K < Kmax, we can calculate
(2.10) aV _x aU(K,s=l) + 2(l-x) au(K,s=2)so thK aK
so that
(2.11) a2V _ aU(K s=l) - 2 U(K,s=2).
aKax aK 'aK
Since K > Kmin, aU/aK(K,s=2) is less than zero and the
expression for a2V/aKax is greater than zero.
We proceed inductively.
that Kmin. < K
mi(2.12)
(2.12)
In period t, if K is such
< K (st+l=l), then
aV =U (aV xr
=K (l-x) a-K(K St+l=2) + (KKr-,,r+l)
and aKV > 0.aKax
If K (St+l=l)t-tl < K < K we havemax'
(2.13) aK(K,x,r) = x(au(Kst+l=l) +
OaV (K, xr,r+l)) + (l-x)(-U(K, st+=2) +
3aV(K, x r r+l))
aK r+T'
and again 3K;x > 0. We conclude > 0 for3ax aKax
Kmin < K ma x<K%in max
A proof of similar form works for aKar' In the
interests of space we only describe the calculation.
Consider T-2. Part 1 showed > for KKr min
< K < KT·
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a2 V
Differentiating (2.10) with respect to r shows aKVr = 0
for KT_1 K < Ka . Proceeding inductively, differen-
max
2V .
tiating (2.12) shows aKar > for Kmin < K < K t+l
(Note that the appearance of aKx in the expression for
2 V
Tug makes it strictly positive.) For K such that
.,.
K (s t+l=l) < K < K, differentiate (2.13) with respect
to r. The derivative of the second term, corresponding
to St+l=2, is positive, but the derivative of the first
term, corresponding to St+l=l, has ambiguous sign. Ex-
pand the first term into terms corresponding to
st+2=1 and st+2=2. Again the derivative of the second
term is positive, the first term ambiguous. Proceeding
in this manner, we always find the ambiguous term is of
D 3V xr + T - t
the form -a ((K, r + - tr + T - t)), corresponding
to a perfect string of good states from t+l to T. But
as T-, this term goes to zero for any K < Kma. Wemax
a2V
conclude Kr > 0. q.e.d.
We have worked out an example in which the optimal
holding of an illiquid asset is positively related not
only to the subjective probability that it will bring
a good return (xt), but also to the certainty which the
investor attaches to that probability (rt). This seems
rather realistic. Note that in this example, the para-
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meter rt can equally well be interpreted as the degree
of investor certainty or as the inverse of the expected
impact of new information on priors -- an "information
potential" measure. rt can not be interpreted, however,
as a measure of riskiness. Risk has already been ac-
counted for by the expected utility function An
investor could still consider a project to be very
risky even if his rt equalled infinity. On the other
hand, even a risk-neutral investor may defer investment
if his rt is too low.
Another realistic aspect of this example is the
importance of timing of investments. Timing does not
enter most theories of investment; usually, agents
are theorized either 1) to make an investment, or 2)
not to make an investment, according to some set of
criteria. The present analysis adds another option for
the agent: 3) wait and get new information. Thus there
is a decision about when as well as whether to invest.
Section IV of this paper presents an application in
which investment timing is of paramount importance.
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III. A Dirichlet Example: Nonstationary Case
Our purpose in introducing irreversibility into in-
vestment theory was to help explain the volatility of
durable investment over the cycle. So far, however,
we have not seen much reason for investment to be un-
stable over time. This is remedied in this section as
we drop the assumption that the distribution generating
the returns to investment is stationary. We consider
the behavior of an agent who, even as he learns about
the true contemporaneous distribution of returns, is
aware that that distribution itself may make discrete,
random shifts at random intervals.
The agent's statistical decision problem varies
according to whether or not he knows, independently of
the observed states, when a distribution shift has
occurred. It is more realistic and more interesting
to assume that the agent does not know directly when
a shift occurs, but must infer it. His problem --
detecting a change in the distribution of a random
variable from realizations of the random variable alone
-- is studied in statistics under the heading of dynamic
inference. Our plan for this section is 1) briefly to
For a good description of dynamic inference, see Howard
(1964). Our exposition of the subject relies heavily on
that paper.
illustrate the method of dynamic inference, using the
Dirich.let distribution as an example; 2) to contrast
the nonstationary information structure to our previous
case; and 3) to reconsider the irreversible investment
problem in a particularly simple example.
Suppose there are n possible states of nature,
s = 1,2,...,n. One state is drawn independently each
period from an underlying, imperfectly known multinomial
distribution. The underlying distribution itself may
change. The probability of the distribution changing
in a given period is equal to a fixed number q, inde-
pendent of the history of changes. When a change occurs,
the old distribution is replaced by a new drawing from
a Dirichlet meta-distribution with parameters (al,a2,
n *
...,an;r=ai). Successive distributions are independent.
The decision problem in time t is to infer the probabil-
ity of each state in t+l, given the history of obser-
vations s, s2 ,...,s t.
We define some notation. Let
st = (Sl's2'.' st) be the vector of observations
up to t
ct = (Cc2''... cm(i)) be the i-th possible
"change vector".
A Markov process assumption would probably be more real-
istic here.
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Each change vector represents a possible history of
dates in which the underlying distribution changed.
c1 is the period in which the last distribution change
occurred, c2 the next-to-last change date, and so on.
-i
m(i) is the total number of changes in change vector c.
All possible change vectors have to be considered be-
cause the agent cannot observe the true history of
changes. We will adopt the convention that a change
occurring in period T occurs after the realization of sT
As before, let hj(tl,t2) equal the number of times state
j is observed between periods t1 and t2, inclusive.
The agent's problem is to find
(3.1) P(st+J st).
Using the laws of conditional probability, (3.1) can be
expanded as
(3.2) i P(st+l stc t) Pj(ctlst)
P(st+l stc t ) is just the probability of st+l' given the
history of observations and the date of the distri-
bution changes. But if we know when the distribution
last changed, we are back in the old Dirichlet situation
and can write
a. + h. (t+l t)
(3.3) P(st+lt, ) = j '____
r+ t - c
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The agent must also consider P(ctIst), the probability
of a given change vector given the observations. (We
will subsequently think of the P(ctst ) 's as weights on
the Dirichlet distributions defined by (3.3).) Using
Bayes's Law, we write
P(S IC) P(Ci
(3.4) P(ctls ) = t t t
t t c P(tg ICt) P(E
c t t(st t
P(st ct) is the probability of observing the actual
history of states, given a particular change vector.
This is found as follows: 1) Divide history into
m(i) + 1 regimes, whose boundaries are the change dates
--iin ct. 2) For each regime, use the Dirichlet priors
and the states observed during that regime to calculate
the posterior multinomial distribution. 3) Find P(st cti)
as the product over the regimes of the probability of
the states actually observed in each regime, given the
posterior distributions.
We need only find P(ct) and we will have completely
specified the appropriate way of inferring P(st+llst).
P(ct) is the unconditional probability of a given change
vector. This depends on m(i), the number of changes.
Since changes in successive periods are independent and
occur with fixed probability q, P(ct) is given by a
binomial density where the number of "successes" equals
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m(i), with a probability of success equalling q.
is,
(T3.5) P(Ct ) = [mi)m(i)q (t-m(i))l - q .
This completes the evaluation of the constituent parts
of P(s st+l t
We are ready to contrast heuristically the evolution
of information potential in this environment with that
of the stationary environment of the last section.
Information potential has been defined as the expected
impact of a new observation on an agent's subjective
probabilities. In the stationary Dirichlet case, in-
formation potential decreases monotonically over time,
with l/rt· A long-enough history of observations re-
duces the value of a new observation effectively to
zero.
The behavior of information potential is different
in the non-stationary case. As we see from (3.2) and
(3.3), priors in this model are not described by a
single Dirichlet distribution, but rather by a weighted
sum (over all possible change vectors) of Dirichlets.
It is to be understood that the rest of this section
contains no formal results, other than the simple ex-
ample. This discussion should be taken as a form of
"intellectual venture capital" or as a description of
future research.
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A new observation in this model changes beliefs in two
ways, First, it updates each of the Dirichlets in the
weighted sum, just as new observations update the simple
Dirichlet in the stationary case. Second, it changes
the weights with which the individual Dirichlets count
in the prior, increasing the weights of distributions
that tend to predict the new observation, decreasing
the weights of others.
Because of the second way that new observations
affect priors, the information potential at a given
time in the nonstationary case may either increase or
decrease. Consider this example. Suppose that q,
the probability of a change, is small, and that for
many periods the possible states have appeared in rela-
tively stable proportions. Then the probabilities
of change-vectors that include a recent change are
low, and the highest weights in the prior are given to
"old" Dirichlets with correspondingly high values of
r. At this point a new observation can have little
effect on beliefs. But now suppose there follow a
number of "unusual" (relative to the prior) observations.
This makes change-vectors which include a recent change
relatively more likely, so that more weight is given
to "new" low-r Dirichlets. Because, in some sense,
average certainty has decreased, the information value
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of a new observation is larger than before.
More generally: In a nonstationary environment,
new observations carry information not relevant in
the stationary case -- i.e. information bearing on
the probability that there has been a recent change in
the underlying distribution. Unusual observations may
tend to suggest that there has been a recent shift;
expected observations may suggest that none has recently
occurred. When the probability of a recent shift is
large, new observations are important; they are given a
lot of weight in the agent's attempt to tell "where
he is". When the probability of a recent shift is small,
less a priori value is attached to making a new ob-
servat ion.
The combination of irreversibility, as analyzed in
the last section, and this characterization of non-
stationary environments can be used as a descriptive
theory of investment volatility. Willingness to under-
take irreversible investment in a given period varies
inversely with the amount of relevant information that
can be gained by waiting. If the pattern of returns
in the economy tends to be relatively stable over time,
there will not be a large average premium associated
with irreversible investment. If there is introduced
into this usually stable environment the possibility of
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structural change, though the change may as likely be
for good as for bad, investors will cut back to await
new information. This suggests that, when capital is
irreversible, planned investment in a given period can
change radically, though long-run returns on average
change little or not at all. It is worth noting also
that the more "invested up" agents are, the more willing
they are to sacrifice current returns for new information.
This may explain the increasing vulnerability of an
economy in a long recovery to collapses in investment
demand.
It would be nice if we could present here an in-
tuitive investment rule for the nonstationary case
like the one in the last section. Unfortunately, while
we can still characterize the solution in the manner of
Section I, this gives us no additional insights. Un-
like the stationary Dirichlet case, the nonstationary
model has no sufficient statistics other than the com-
plete history of observations. Thus we can pick no
summary measure of belief corresponding to some notion
like "certainty" to prove theorems about. As a second-
best, we briefly present a simple example that illus-
trates some of the points of this section.
Figure 2 illustrates a four-period model, with
three possible states in each period. In each period,
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state 1 is the "high-return" state for the irreversible
capital good; states 2 and 3 have identical "low returns".
State 1 prevails in period 1, the decision period. The
agent puts probability q on the event that a distri-
bution change has occurred in period 1. He puts prob-
ability zero on a distribution change in any other
period. (This last is the key simplifying assumption
in this example.) If the agent knew for sure that
there had been no change of distribution, we assume
he would have Dirichlet priors with parameters (al,a2,
a3;r=zai). If he knew for sure that a change had
occurred, he would have a prior with parameters (bl,b2,
b3;r=zbi). Let us assume that a change does not affect
i
expected returns but does reduce certainty; i.e. al/r =
bl/r and r > r. We also simplify our problem by assum-
ing al/r 1/2. We would like to know the relation of
the parameters of the problem to the optimal investment
decision.
First let us see how the agent's priors evolve.
Transition properties into each state are shown in
Figure 2. These transition probabilities are indeed
in the form of weighted sums of the Dirichlet formula.
The weights correspond to his posterior probabilities
on the change having occurred, given the new obser-
vations. qi is the agent's probability that the change
has occurred, given an observation of state i in period
2. qij is this probability after observation of state
i in period 2 and state j in period 3. These weights
are defined by
q (bill)/(r+l)
(35) qi q(bi+l)/(r+l) + (1-q)(ai+l)/(r+l)
q (b+h i(2 ,3)) (b+h (2, 3))/(r+2)
(3.6) q E J J
2
where DENOM = q(bi+hi(2,3))(bj+hj(2,3))/(r+2) +
- 2(l-q)(ai+hi(2,3))(a +h (2,3))/(r+2)
Let us suppose, for example, that b2/r > a2/r, a3/r >
b3/r, so that the relative likelihood of state 2
versus state 3 increases if a distribution change
occurs. Then one can verify, using (3.5) and (3.6),
that observations of state 2 increase the probability
that a change has occurred, while observations of state
3 decrease this probability. Thus the agent is not
indifferent between observing state 2 and state 3;
even though they both imply the same current return,
they have different information content. Contrast
this to the stationary case, in which there would be no
point in distinguishing state 2 from state 3.
The determination of the optimal holding of K in
period 1 is along the same lines as our example in Sec-
/ r
tion II. We begin by finding the future states in
which a small increase in K1 around its optimum
imposes effective restrictions on choice. These are
the states marked with a solid line in Figure 2; in
each of these states the desired holding is K
In states marked with a dashed line, K1 does not re-
strict holdings; this is seen by symmetry arguments
like the one in Section II and requires our simplifying
assumption that al/r _ 1/2. The first-order condition
for K1 is of the form
(3.7) a-(K1 ,s1=l) + d aU(K,s1 =2,3) = 0
where d has fourteen terms, corresponding to the
probabilities of the fourteen future states in which
the desired holding is K. Inspection or tedious
differentiation gives the following results about K1:
1) An increase in a1 or bl, holding other para-
meters constant, increases K1. An increase in r (al/r
constant) or r (bl/r constant) also increases K1.
2) An increase in the prior change probability
q unambiguously reduces K1, despite the fact that
the probability of a good state is unaffected by a
distribution change.
3) Given that al/r = bl/r, K1 is at its maximum
when we also have a2/r = b2/r and a3/r = b3/r. When
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these equalities hold, the information which an obser-
vation of state 2 or 3 contains about whether a change
has occurred is minimal. Since the information po-
tential of the environment is relatively lower, K1 is
relatively higher.
IV. An Application: Investment When There is an Energy
Cartel
As an illustration and application of the ideas of
this paper, we introduce a simple model of investment
and output in an energy-importing economy after the
unanticipated formation of an energy-exporter's cartel.
It will be shown in this model that uncertainty can
make investment collapse, even if capital dominates
the alternative asset in every period.
We consider the behavior of risk-neutral agents in
the energy-importing economy. At time t this economy
is assumed to have two possible domestic factors of
eproduction: a stock of energy-intensive capital Kt, and
5
a stock of energy-saving capital, Kt. Both stocks are
durable and irreversible. These factors are used to
produce a homogeneous good yt according to the rela-
tion
ee ss e(4.1) t xtKt +xKt 0 x 1
0 < x < 1
= t 
where xe and x are the utilization rates of Ke and
t t t
Kt respectively. Utilization rates are chosen by
the agents in each period in a manner to be specified
shortly. These rates are introduced basically because
we want to assume that energy-using capital is used
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less intensively when the cartel is in existence.
Over time the agents may augment Ke and Ks from
their stock of investible resources. This stock, Wt,
is assumed to be an exogenously-given, increasing
function of time. The investible resources may be
converted costlessly and at a one-for-one basis into
units of Ke or KS. We assume that these resources
pay no return in liquid form and have no alternative
uses. Conversion of investible resources to a specific
form of capital is irreversible. The constraints on
the choice of Ke and Kt are thus given by:t t
(4.2) Ke + t <t t t
e Ke
t - t-l
KS > KS
t = t-l
The state of nature in each period in this model
depends on the status of the energy-exporter's cartel.
We define the state of nature st by
(4.3) st = , if the cartel exists in period t
0, otherwise.
The interpretation of W varies with the choice of agent.
For a small firm, W is he available line of credit.
For an industry (e.g., electric power), W is potential
plant sites, or demand markets. For a naEional economy,
W is aggregate investible resources: labor, land, raw
materials.
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The cartel is assumed to have formed in period to
Agent's beliefs about its continued existence are given
by
(4.4) Pr( st = 1 St-1 = 1 ) = Pt
Pr( st = 1 I St- = ) = 0
where
dpt/dt > 0, lim Pt = 1
t-oo
Thus if the cartel fails, it is assumed to be gone for-
ever. The longer the cartel lasts, the greater is
the agents' common subjective probability of its sur-
vival through the next period. If the cartel survives
long enough, it is assumed to be permanent.
The agents are risk-neutral, so their goal is to
maximize Et -tyT. We shall chart their optimal pro-
T-=t
duction and investment paths as the cartel stubbornly
continues to exist.
First we specify how utilization rates (and current
profitability) are determined. We assume that there are
three per-unit-capital cost functions:
(4.5) CS (xt) = cost per unit Kt associatedt t
with rate xt .
(xe) = cos t per unit KCe,0 (x e) cost per unit forratext t t
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and st = 0e~l e e e
C l(x) = cost per unit K for rate x
and st = 1 .
Costs are in terms of the output good yt' Assume C(O) =
0, dC/dx > 0, d2 C/dx2 > 0 for all cost functions; for
a given x, take dCe '0/dx < dCs/dx < dC e 'l /dx. Thus
energy-saving capital has higher marginal costs than
energy-using capital when there is no cartel, but has
lower costs when the cartel exists.
Net output maximization now yields optimal utili-
-s -e 0 ,e 1zation rates , x0, and x as solutions to
(4.6) dCs(xs)/dx s = 1
dCe, 0 (x-e 0)/dxe, 0 = 1
dC e l(x- e ,l)/ dxe  = 1
These utilization rates are independent of time and
the sizes of the capital stocks, and satisfy the
relation 0 < e, < x With them we can
define the per-period gains from a unit of capital:
n -s -s(4.7) = x - C (xs) = profit per period
from each unit of Ks
-e,O = -e0 e -e profit perx ( x ' ) = profit per
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period per unit of Ke when s = 0
e,l -el e1 -e1l
Terl= x-e Ce(x -e ) = profit per
period per unit of Ke when s = 1
Note that the relation 0 < el < s < e,O holds.
We now look at the evolution of the capital stock
when the cartel refuses to disappear. We note that,
since 1) investors are risk-neutral, 2) investment in
either Ke or Ks is always guaranteed a positive return,
3) uninvested resources pay no return, and 4) invest-
ment is free up to the resource constraint Wt, cap-
ital appears to dominate the alternative in the tradi-
tional risk-return sense. Thus it may appear that in-
vestment will never be below its maximum, equal to
e +KsWt (K1 + Kt 1). This turns out not to be true:
it is possible in this model to have an investment
'pause', during which even risk-neutral investors are
content to cumulate barren liquid resources and wait
for new information.
The analysis that follows is aimed at finding
sufficient conditions for this pause to occur. We
begin by defining Vt(Kt l,Kt l,st) (in the manner of
Section I) as the maximum expected discounted con-
sumption available from period t to the horizon, given
inherited stocks Kte Kt and current state of na-
ture st.
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If st = , (i.e., the cartel has failed) then, by
assumption, it is known with certainty that s = 0, all
T > t. The investors' best plan is to invest all avail-
able resources in Ke, so that for all T t we have
e S e SK = W K Thus we can write Vt(K a st=O)
explicitly as
(4.8) Vt(Ktl Kt-l1 , =
T {t{ t sK1 + e, (W K1 ) }
Tbbevitin t-l e in t-l
0
Abbreviating the expression in (4.8) by Vt, we can write
(4.9) aVo /aKe =t t-l 0
av/a3Kl = E B T-t( S- e,0)
=tt
= (s Ie,0)/(l ) <
As predicted in Section I, "marginal regret"
.
(-DV/aK)
for a given investment is either zero or positive,
depending on whether the subsequent state is "good" or
"bad" for that investment.
When st = 1 (the cartel is still in existence), we
have
e SVt(K _Ktl,Stl) max K S +
e s
Kt ,Kt
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(4.10)
S{PtVt+(Kt Kt,st+ll) +
e S(1-Pt)Vt+I(Kt, Ktst+l=O) }
subject to
e eKe >Ket = t-l
Kt > Kt l
W > Ke + KSt = t t
so that
(4.11) aV1/aKe = e
' -
aV /aKs =t t-l t
where e > 0, s > 0 are the (constant for given t andt = t =
st) Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
e> e s S
e > Kt 1 and K Kt respectively.
The investor's problem in period t with st = 1 is
(4.12) max welK e + SKs +t t t
Kt ,Kt
S{PtVt+l (Kt,Kts, t+l=l) +
e S(l-Pt)Vt+l (Kt , K t ' St+l) 
subject to the three constraints. Using (4.9) and
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(4.11), the first-order conditions are
e, Pe 1 e
t+l Pt t
s s e) 
+I- B
(4.13a) (Ke )
(4.13b) (KS)
S S W= 0
Pt t+l +X t 
where It > 0 is the multiplier associated with the con-t 
straint W > Ke + Kt = t t, Xw is strictly greater than zerot
when the resource constraint is binding. Since the
risk-neutral investor always picks a corner solution,
we can identify an investment 'pause' with periods t
such that w = 0 (or, equivalently, with periods t such
t
that te > 0 and Xs > 0). The following proposition
t t
gives sufficient conditions for w = 0.
t
Proposition. Sufficient conditions for Xt = 0 in thist
problem are
's < ae,O
< l a1 =
1 - + Pt
Proof. Let t go to infinity, holding st = 1. By
assumption lim Pt = 1. If Pt = 1 all investment is in
tto
K , so that lim Xw =
too t
This implies lim = 0,
toOt
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1)
and
2) e,1 2
< a27T
1 - + (l-pt )
SPt
a2 -
nim Ae = (S-se'., /(1-6). The limits of Xt and e re-1im x
t t e-
present their lower and upper bounds, respectively.
w wWe want sufficient conditions for xt = 0. = 0
is equivalent to (Xe > 0 X > 0) By (4.13a), e > 0
t t t
if el - pttel Xw < 0. Since Xw > 0 and e is
t t tB=t t+l
bounded above by (S-e'l )/(l-), a sufficient condition
is e,l < Bp t (s_,e,l) which is equivalent to 2).
Similarly, by (4.13b), s = tw - ( + -t)
t t t
(,s -eO)) + pt Xt+ls which is unambiguously positive
if 1) holds. q.e.d.
Since t is monotonic for s = 1, if either of these
conditions is true it will be true over a continuous
interval of time. The continuous interval in which the
two conditions intersect will have Xw = 0, i.e., there
is no investment for any value of Wt. It is numer-
ically plausible that this intersection will exist.
Suppose = .9, t = .5. Then X = 0 if el < .82 rt
and r < .82 re O. Other things equal, the more dis-
parate are the profitabilities e,l s and we,O the
more likely it is that a pause will occur, and the long-
er it will be if it does occur. An example: Say that
we have, at time t, a set of profitabilities (e l,s
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e,O) such that agents invest all available resources.
Now suppose that eO were to be multiplied by a thou-
sand, rrs by a hundred, and el by ten, This huge
increase in the value of capital will likely drive
current investment to zero! This is because the in-
creased value of waiting for new information more than
offsets the improvement in current returns,
Under the assumption that a pause occurs and
taking Wt as linear, Figure 3 traces the path of the
energy-importing economy over time.
In the figure the pause runs from t1 to t2. (We
show t1 > to, the period of the cartel's formation; an
alternative possibility is t = t0) The history of
the economy is as follows. From t0 to t1 investors
give insufficient credence to the cartel to desist from
energy-intensive investment. By t the future has
become sufficiently ambiguous that investors prefer
to remain liquid and wait for new information. Fin-
ally, at t2, the continued existence of the cartel
seems sufficiently likely that investors commit them-
selves with a bang to energy-saving capital. There is
an investment spurt as cumulated liquidity is trans-
formed to a stock of KS.
To put the development of the economy in terms of
our heuristic "information potential" measure: In the
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intervals (t0 ,t1) and (t2 ,), investors feel that they
know the true long-run situation with a relatively high
probability. Information potential is low and investors
are relatively willing. In the period (tl,t2), the
future is more uncertain. The information value of
waiting is high, and investors hold back.
We can see that, although nothing observable
changes in the investors' environment after t, the
development of the economy is not smooth. Investment
is quite volatile. As the figure shows, output also
dips and then rises. This output movement reflects
only changes in utilization rates and the composition
of capital; the variability of output would be increased
if we explicitly included the production of capital
goods. Aggregate capacity utilization is cyclical,
reflecting the existence of the cartel and the changing
composition of capital.
We did not include a labor input in the model, but
it would be easy to do so. If we postulated that 1)
labor supply is inelastic, 2) there are fixed costs
in training a worker for a specific job, or in moving
a worker from one job to another, and 3) current labor
costs vary with the rate of utilization of the labor
force, then the allocation of labor would parallel that
of capital. There would be a pause, followed by a spurt,
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of new hires as entrepreneurs wait to see to which
technology new workers should be committed. Meanwhile,
while the cartel lasts, workers already employed in the
energy-intensive sector would face low utilization rates
(layoffs and short hours). If the cartel failed, these
workers would experience higher rates (callbacks and
overtime).
Two comments conclude our discussion of this ex-
ample.
First, as an explanation of the recent recession,
our model is obviously oversimplified. It does seem,
however, that uncertainty has been a major reason for
the weakness of investment since 1973 -- uncertainty
not only about the effectiveness of OPEC, but about
the long-run nature of domestic policy, the prospects of
new technologies, the future of worldwide economic con-
ditions. Caution is the order of the day for investors.
Second, we note that the "cycle" generated by this
model represents a completely efficient use of re-
sources, given technology and beliefs. The output
changes are supply-induced and do not depend on de-
mand shortfall. Thus, government interference for
efficiency reasons would not be warranted in this
economy, given that markets work well in accommodating
output variations. This last proviso is an important
61
It is considered in the third chapter
of this thesis.
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one, however,.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that when investment is
irreversible, it will sometimes pay agents to defer
commitment of scarce investible resources in order
to wait for new information. Uncertainty about the
long-run environment which is potentially resolvable
over time thus exerts a depressing effect on current
levels of investment. We have conjectured that changes
in the general level of uncertainty may explain some
of the volatility of investment demand associated with
cyclical fluctuations.
There are numerous avenues for future research
suggested by this topic.
First, the basic model should be generalized to
a more realistic description of the investment decision.
Some interesting extensions are:
1) The incorporation of information flows that are
not purely exogenous. For example, the possibility of
"learning-by-doing" induced by the investment process
may create a positive incentive investment in some
uncertain situations.
2) The removal of the "zero-one" character of
irreversibility in our model. If we allow for partial
convertibility of capital stock, we can analyze the
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decision to commit to, say, flexible (but higher-cost)
technologies ver.sus' more restrictive options.
3) The addition of flow constraints. If there are
high costs associated with converting investible re-
sources into capital at a rapid rate, the results of
the model are modified. Keeping one's portfolio com-
pletely in investible resources is clearly no longer
the most cautious option in this case, since the pen-
alty for underinvestment will be greater than one per-
iod's foregone output.
Second, the relation of this model to business
cycle theory must be taken beyond heuristics and put
into a general equilibrium structure. An important
task is to show how the central planner's solution of
this paper (as in Section IV) is duplicated by a com-
petitive economy. It should be possible to show that
the aggregate decision of competitive investors looks
like that of the planner, even when the investors
believe that capital markets are perfect (so that the
"scarcity of investible resources" assumption is vio-
lated on the micro-level). The mechanism that enforces
this is speculation in the investible resources market.
This speculation adds a premium to the price of in-
vestible resources analogous to the "user cost" added
to the price of exhaustible resources. When uncertain-
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ty is high, a high premium in the price of investible
resources depresses competitive investment.
Finally, this work has many potential microeconomic
applications. An example is the problem of choosing a
technique in a field where the technology is changing
rapidly. Should a firm buy the current-generation
computer system or speculate by waiting for a system
that is better and cheaper? The decision to wait or
commit in a given period depends not only on expected
system improvement (return) but also on how much one
can expect to learn in the short run about long-run
technical possibilities (information potential).
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Appendix 1
To show Vt(KltK 2t , KktSt) is concave in
(Klt,K 2t' . * Kkt )
Lemma: Let f be a concave function ik e g1 Let x and
y be k-vectors, Define g(y) max f(x).
x>>y
Then g(y) is
concave in y.
Proof will show g not concave implies f not concave. g
not concave implies g(ty1 + (l-t)y2) < tg(y1) + (l-t)g(y2).
Let f(xl) = max f(x), f(x2) = max f(x). Now txl + (l-t)x 2
XY 1l X.Y2
> ty1 + (l-t)y2, so f(tx1l + (-t)x 2 ) g(ty1 + (l-t)y2),
by definition of g. But g(ty1 + (l-t)y2) < tg(y1) +
(l-t)g(y2) = tf(xl) + (l-t)f(x2). By transitivity, this
implies f(tx1 + (l-t)x2) < tf(x1) + (1-t)f(x2), which im-
plies that f is not concave. So f concave implies g con-
cave. //
Main result is by induction. VT(K,s) = max U(KsT).
K>>K
U is concave so VT is concave. Now suppose Vt+1 is concave.
Vt(K,s) = max ( U(K, s ) +pi Vt+1(K, - +) ) The sum of
K>>K
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concave functions is concave, so by the same lemma Vt is
concave. q e.d
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Appendix 2
To show the existence of an asymmetry in the investment
decision when the gestation period is nonzero.
Let the gestation period be of length g. Thus
sions about K+g are made in period T. Assume that
vestments in the pipeline are irreversible.
Analogously to (1.4), define
deci-
in-
Vt(Kt+gl1 st) = max
Kt+g t+g-lKt+g1
g h 
B h P(St+g 1st).
U(Kt+g' t+g) + B z
j P(t+l St+
Vt+l (Kt+g ' st+ )
where now Vt is the maximum expected utility for (t+g,T).
The first-order condition analogous to (1.6) is
g h P(s hIs) u g h +p (t+g Ki t+g, St+g +
B p(st~j I> t+l (Ri j) = 0 
Pt+lst ) aK (Kt+g,St+l) = 
As when the gestation period was zero, aVt+l/K i is
less than zero for states st+l in which the investment
decision of period t is 'regretted'; i.e., Ki,t+g >
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When the constraint is not effective,
Dvt+l/aKi = 0. The thought experiment of Section I (pp.
21-22) goes through with no difficulty. Make those states
st+l for which aVt+l/aKi < 0 "a little worse" (increase
-aVt+l/Ki slightly). No improvement of the prospects of
Ki in states for which aVt+l/aKi = 0 can prevent a reduc-
tion of investment in period t.
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Ki,t+g+l (-t+1
CHAPTER TWO
EFFICIENT EXCESS CAPACITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A TWO-
SECTOR ECONOMY WITH FIXED INPUT PROPORTIONS
Introduction
The macroeconomic policy goal of having the economy
reach "potential GNP" in each period is based, at least
in part, on the assumption that it is economically ineffi-
cient to allow capital and labor stocks to stand idle.
This assumption may seem reasonable, especially if
depreciation is independent of rates of production and
variable costs are small. In fact, this assumption is
correct only if input stocks have no "specificity"; i.e.,
if they are costlessly transferable between sectors or
uses. If transfer is costly, then under some circumstan-
ces dynamic efficiency will require assigning input stocks
to sectors where they will be temporarily idle, rather
than to sectors where they could be currently productive.
In order to develop this and related results, this
paper studies the class of economies with the follow-
ing characteristics:
1) There is more than one productive sector.
2) Capital is durable; purchases of plant and
equipment are made with the knowledge that
their useful lives extend into the uncertain
future. Capital is also "bolted down", i.e.,
sector-specific.
3) Future "investment opportunities", in a broad
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sense, are perceived as uncertain.
4) There are worker mobility costs. This imparts a
quality of durability to labor analogous to that
of capital, in the sense that the use of labor
requires initial sunk costs.
5) There is limited factor substitutability ex
ante; at least in the short- and medium-runs,
the set of possible capital-labor ratios has
fixed positive bounds.
To analyze this class of economies, we will employ
a simple model that embodies these assumptions in an
extreme form. For example, rather than discussing econ-
omies where factor substitutability is merely bounded,
we shall take the limiting case and speak mainly about
fixed-coefficients technologies (in which there is no
substitution at all). These restrictions, however, are
largely for the purposes of exposition. Intuition should
suggest that our results will hold approximately in the
most general case.
This paper has two sections. Part I sets up one
simple two-sector model which is to be used throughout.
We consider the problem of a central planner for this
economy searching for the optimal allocation of resources
over time. A key result is that best allocation will
sometimes require the temporary unemployment of capital,
72
labor, or both.
In Part II we get rid of the planner and introduce
a monetary market version of the model. The behavior
of consumers, firms, and workers is characterized in a
unified way by the introduction of a time-state discount
factor derived from expected utility theory. This economy
is compared with the planning version. Here also we see
that there are efficiency reasons for the existence of
idle resources, even resources that are not "used up"
when employed in production.
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I. Throughout the paper we will be considering the
following economic model:
The economy is assumed to function over a horizon
of T discrete periods, indexed t = 1,...,T with given
initial conditions.
There are two sectors, consumption goods and capital
goods, each of which produces a homogeneous product.
Capital and labor, the only inputs, are used in fixed
proportions - an extreme form of the assumption of lim-
ited factor substitutability. With normalization we can
write
(1.1) Ct = min(KctLct)
It = min(Kktla,Lkt/b )
where Ct is consumption, It is investment (the output of
the capital goods sector), inputs are indexed by sector
and period, and a and b are constants.
We want somehow to convey the idea that future
investment opportunities are uncertain. There are many
ways to model this. Let us assume that the future
effectiveness of investment goods in creating new capa-
city (or, alternatively, the relative productivity of the
investment goods sector) is a random variable. Rewrite
the investment goods production function as
(1.2) It = min(Kkt/a,Lkt/b) · t
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where {et } is a stochastic sequence. (Note that this is
equivalent to retaining a nonstochastic capital goods
production function and writing
(1.2a) Kct = K + I ct - ct- c,t-1 t-1
Kkt = Kk,t-1 + Ik,t-1 e Ot-1
where Ict and Ikt are investment in each of the two
sectors.)
The specification (1.2) means that some periods
(when t is large) are "good" for investment - i.e.,
a fixed amount of input in the investment goods sector
produces a large investment to capacity - and other
periods (small t) are "bad". (The current realization
of is assumed to be known when investment decisionst
are made.)
In this model, investment goods are homogeneous
when produced, but once they are added to the capacity
of either sector we shall assume that they are bolted
down and cannot be transferred. Capacity is also
perfectly durable. These conditions, plus the require-
ment that total investment may not exceed the output of
the capital goods sector, may be summarized as
(1.3) Kct = Kc,t-1 + Ict-1 Ictl 0
c,t-1 
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Kkt Kk, t-l + Ik,t-1 Ik,t-1 - 0
Ict + Ikt - It
where, again, Kct and Kkt are sectoral capital stocks in
period t; Ict and Ikt are investment in each of the two
sectors in period t; and It is the output of the capital
goods sector.
Labor can be assigned either to the consumption
or capital goods sector, up to the current total labor
pool:
(1.4) Lct + Lkt Lt
However, there are real mobility costs for labor;
transferring a worker from the unassigned pool to one of
the sectors, or from one sector to the other, costs
vt units of consumption goods. We will want to assume
that the future effective labor force (which may include
labor-augmenting technical change) is known. To remove
some diffculties not of direct relevane here,
we will also assume that the labor force increases
monotonically.
(1.5) Lt > Lt .
Now let us imagine that this economy is .centrally
planned. The planner has perfect information about the
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state of the economy in the current period, t, and has
complete control of allocations. He also knows, or
thinks he knows, the stochastic process that is generating
0. His problem in period t is to assign the labor force
and allocate investment so as to maximize a social wel-
fare function over the horizon. The SWF is a discounted
sum of expected aggregate utilities, utility being a
function of consumption net of labor mobility costs.
Formally, he must solve
T
(1.6) max -t E( U ( ic()))
Ict' Ikt, it
Lct' Lkt
subject to:
1) given initial values of Kct, Kkt, Lc,tl
Lkt 1l and t
and 2) constraints (1.1) to (1.5), replicated
for each period i = t,t+l,...,T ,
where B = a constant discount factor,
Ci(e) = ci( ) - vi(max(L ci-L i-l') +
max(Lki-Lk i-l' ))
is consumption net of mobility costs, and
expectations are taken with respect to
and as of period t.
This is, of course, a problem in dynamic optimization;
.7
we may think of it as a sequence of single period problems,
with the decisions of each period determining the initial
conditions of subsequent periods. There is a well-devel-
oped methodology, due to Bellman and others, for solving
this - at least in specific cases. We consider this
methodology briefly. The first step is to define a new
function, Vt, equal to the maximum attainable value of
the objective function as of period t:
(1.7) Vt V(KctKktLc,t-l'Lkt- l'et)
T
max I i- t E( U (ci(e)))
ct, Ikt, i=t
Lct' Lkt
subject to the constraints and to the initial conditions
that form the arguments of Vt. The planner's problem
can now be rewritten
(1.8) max U(min(Kct,Lct) - vt(max(Lct-Lc,t-l 0)
ct' kt'
Lct' Lkt + max(Lkt-Lk, 0))) +
E(Vt+l(Kct+Ict'Kkt+Ikt Lct Lkt' t+l ))
subject only to current-period constraints and initial
conditions. This is Bellman's Optimality Principle, that
any optimal path can be broken up into subpaths that are
optimal with respect to their initial conditions.
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If we knew the form of Vt+1, then the problem would
be reduced to the one-period type and could be easily
solved. Vt+1 can be obtained, in principle at least,
by working recursively backwards from period T. Begin
by noting that we do know the form of VT:
(1.9) VT(KcTKkTLcT- 1 L k mT cT T)
max U(min(KcTLcT)- v(max(LcT-Lc T-_l,)))
L
cT
VT 1 can now be obtained as a function of initial con-
ditions, by solving (1.8) for t = T-1. Proceeding re-
cursively, work back to the decision period. The result
of this exercise is a nonstochastic optimal first period
allocation. As later values of the stochastic sequence
{Oi} become known, nonstochastic values for the allo-
cations in periods t+l to T can be calculated from the Vi
We know, then, how the planner can solve his problem
for any specific set of initial values, parameters, and
functional forms. Unfortunately, there is no simple way
to write down this solution in the general case; the ex-
pressions for the optimal allocations grow more compli-
cated with each stage of recursion, and the side condi-
tions multiply rapidly.
While we cannot find an explicit solution to the gen-
eral planner's problem, we can at least hope to character-
7Q
ize that solution in an interesting way. One approach is
suggested by the dynamic stochastic programming pro-
cedure just discussed. With that procedure, current
decisions are made under the assumption that all future
allocations will be optimal, given the current decisions
(the Optimality Principle). Let us think of future opti-
mal allocations explicitly as functions of current
(period t) allocations and of realizations of oi . (We
take initial conditions in period t as fixed.) Denoting
an optimal allocation with an asterisk, we can write
(1.10) I I)(110) ci = Ici(Ict'IktLctLkt, i})
ki = Tki 1 ct'1 kt' ct' kt' t+l'- i)
ci ci(Ict,ktctLktt+ i })
Lki Lki(IctIktLct Lkt, t+l--... i})
for i = t+l,...,T .
In the obvious way we would now write down the La-
grangian of the general planner's problem, including the
constraints for each period, in a form depending only on
the expectations (as of period t) of (Ici,Iki, Lci ,Lki)
i = t+l,...,T and on the current decision variables: It,
Ikt Lct, and Lkt. This Lagrangian can be viewed as a
function of only the current decision variables, since
80
expected future optimal allocations depend only on these
variables, We maximize by differentiating with respect
to the current variables, noting that the envelope theorem
permits us to ignore changes in (i,IkiLci Lki) 
Assume that in the current period it is optimal to invest
in both sectors, so that the nonnegativity constraints
on Ict and Ikt are not binding. Then this procedure
yields the following necessary conditions:
(1.11) (Consumption sector investment)
T t
it = E( U' (ci(O)) Zli())i=t+l I ()
1
where Zli = 1-X2i
Ci Kct + Ict +
Kct
if Kci < Lci
if Kci = Lci
otherwise.
I cj
j=t+l cj
, i> t
, i=t
(Capital sector investment)
T 
Xlt = I i E(X li (a) Zi())
i=t+l
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and
(1.12)
1where Z2i = 1
0
(1.13)
if Kki Lki
if Kki = Lki
otherwise.
(Consumption sector labor)
2t = U'(ct)((-Zlt)
T
i=t+l
- vt(Z3t))
i-t E('( i ( )) (-Z li (e)) -2i() ).
where Z3 i = O
11
if L > L ci c,-1
otherwise.
(Capital sector labor)
2t = xlt(-F)(1-Z2t)
TT 8i-t E
i=t+l
- U' (ct)vt(Z4t) +
i( ) (-Z2i
if Lki > Lk,i-l
otherwise.
Expectations are understood to be conditional on infor-
mation in period t and to be with respect to t.
Despite the notational difficulties, these conditions
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+
(1.14)
where Z4i
11
have obvious economic interpretations. First, note that
the Lagrange multipliers li and x2i represent the mar-
ginal values in period t of a unit of uncommitted capital
or labor, respectively. As the necessary conditions
imply, at an optimum these marginal values must be the
same in each of the two alternate uses.
The marginal value of a unit of consumption sector
capital, given by (1.11), is the discounted consumption
value of its marginal product in all future periods. In
periods when consumption sector capital is expected to
be greater than consumption sector labor (the indicator
Zli=0), this marginal product is zero; when consumption
capital is expected to be the binding constraint (Zli=l),
the expected marginal product is a unit of consumption
goods.
Similarly, the expected marginal product of a unit
of investment sector capital (1.12) is zero for periods
when excess capacity in that sector is expected (Z2 i=0).
In periods of expected insufficient capacity, the mar-
ginal product is 0i/a units of investment goods, each of
which has a discounted value of B ti-it. The marginal
value of an unassigned labor unit is expressed either by
(1.13) or (1.14). The expressions are similar to those
for capital; i.e., the expected marginal product of a
unit of labor is positive only in those periods when ex-
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pected optimal allocations make sectoral labor, rather
than sectoral capital, the binding constraint. A differ-
ence between labor and capital is that labor has mobility
costs, which must be deducted from the expression for
value. Also, 2i must be deducted from product to correct
for the possibility that labor might have been brought in
later at lower mobility cost. If we assumed the exist-
ence of variable installation costs for capital, the
two sets of equations would be exactly analogous.
Note that Xlt=0 implies that the economy is satur-
ated with capital, both in the current and future per-
iods. X2t=0 means that the discounted product of a
worker for periods t to T is not sufficient to overcome
current mobility costs.
From these conditions we can draw several conclu-
sions about the nature of the planner's optimal solu-
tion:
1) When capital is durable and there are labor mo-
bility costs, current optimal allocation depends not only
on the current state of the economy but, in a complicated
way, on all future states. Any econometric model, say,
that looks at investment or employment as dependent only
on current variables is implicitly assuming a very naive
set of economic agents. This, of course, is a major point
of Lucas's well-known critique.
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2) An optimal plan for this economy may include
(intentional) periods of excess capital capacity. To
see this, we note that necessary conditions (1,11) and
(1.12) ascribe positive value to capital additions as
long as there is some future period in which the sector
is expected not to have excess capacity. Thus it is
conceivable that an optimal plan might call for, say,
capital additions to a sector which currently has idle
capital, at the expense of the other sector which may
currently be capital-short. If, for example, future
values of 0 are expected to be high, it may well be
efficient to hoard capital in the capital goods sector,
despite current shortages of consumption sector capital
or capital sector labor. Alternatively, if a labor
supply spurt is expected in the future, it may be effi-
cient first to build up the capital sector and then to
maintain excess capital capacity in both sectors, until
labor becomes available.
3) Just as there is the possibility of efficient
excess capital capacity, there may be efficient unem-
ployment of labor resources. This may arise from one
of several causes. First, as in the case of capital,
necessary conditions (1.13) and (1.14) imply a positive
marginal value to sectoral labor as long as there is some
future period in which all the sector's labor is utilized.
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Thus there is no inconsistency between these conditions
and a plan that, say, hoards labor in a sector that is
currently capital-short but where relative productivity
is secularly increasing. Second, unlike capital goods,
we have not assumed that labor must be committed to one
or the other sector as soon as it becomes available.
The value of maintaining a pool of uncommitted resources
when there is uncertainty has already been discussed in
our first Chapter, and the same arguments apply here.
Finally, in this model, maximum output and maximum em-
ployment may be incompatible goals in the long run. In-
deed, for certain values of the parameters, at least, the
strategy that maximizes employment - the committing of
all resources to the capital goods sector - corresponds
exactly to the strategy that minimizes consumption and
the level of utility.
4) With positive mobility costs, efficient excess
capacity and unemployment can exist in the economy at
the same time. This is because with nonzero mobility
costs it is not worthwhile to move labor between sectors
to take advantage of short-lived opportunities. Move-
ment will occur only if the long-run value of the worker
in the alternative sector exceeds his value in his pre-
sent sector plus mobility costs.
Because we have assumed that (given the availability
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of input stocks) the. variable costs of production are
zero, no optimal plan in this model will ever include
contemporaneous excess capacity and unemployment in the
same sector. This defect is remedied in our model of
Chapter 3. There, changes in the marginal costs of
utilization permit the coexistence of layoffs and idle
machines within a given sector.
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II. Let us move this model economy into a monetary mar-
ket framework. It is our object to characterize briefly
agent behavior and to search for the correspondences be-
tween the market and planning version.
Suppose that consumers in this economy 1) are inter-
temporal optimizers, 2) have separable von Neumann-Mor-
genstern utility functions that depend on net consump-
tion and real balances only, and 3) in each period make
joint decisions about consuming, building up real bal-
ances, purchasing shares of firms in a stock market,
and working. Then we may write the i-th consumer's
problem as:
T
(2.1) max W. = jt E(U i(Cij (O)-vij (),
Mit, sit j=t iJ iJ
vit
mi ()))
such that
Mit it + Hit + it +itRt 
(~it- i,t-)Xt - Pcit
and = Yit (vit)
where . = a constant discount factor
c.. = real consumption (in period j)
13
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mi.. = real balances
3-J
v.. = real mobility costs incurred1J
M.. = nominal balances
H.. = nominal transfers
Yij = real labor income
= the vector of fractions of firms
13
held by the i-th individual
(i Sij = (1,1, .,.1))
R. = the vector of firm dividend
payments
X. = the vector of firm market values
pj = the price of consumption goods
The stochastic process generating 0t will be assumed
known, for simplicity; however, the results can easily
accomodate Bayesian priors. The current value of 0 -
and hence, current dividends and market values - are
assumed known. Note that the consumption decision is
implicit.
The necessary conditions for an interior solution
can be derived:
(2.2) (Money holdings)
1 u (c mt) 1 u (c
Pt c t' Pt m (t'm) +
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mt+l ( t+l)) - Ptl (t+ dO t+l = 0Pt 1i tt+
(Stock holdings)
1 au (Ct mt) (Rtt) + t tf +
- (C O t+lot+ t+l))DC t+l (O~ t
1 
Pt+ t+ Xt t+l( t+l 0
where tft+l is the distribution of ot+l given in-
formation in period t, and the i-subscripts have been
suppressed.
We can rewrite these conditions as:
DU (ctmt)
au (Ct mt)
t = Rt + t+1
+ o f at(0 ) 1 d t+ l) 1 tt+l
at(ot+i) Xt+i(ot+l) dt+,
at( t+l) =
Pt - (Ct+l(Ot 'mt+l (Ot+l) )t t f+l (Ot l)
Pt+(0t+l) a- (c, mt)
90
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
where
f lu~a
a tt+l ot+l) ,DC( t+i (t-+tl t+l
can be viewed as a generalized time-state discount factor.
This discount factor is of some interest, because it is
easily shown that for any asset with current value Pt,
return rt, and uncertain future values Pt+l(0t+l) an
optimizing consumer who holds some of the asset will set
(2.6) Pt rt + 0 + at( t+l) (t+l) dot+l
t+l
In particular, (2.4) has the interpretation that the
current price of money (equal to one) equals current
services of money plus the discounted future value of
money (equal to one in all states). Similarly, (2.5)
says that current firm market values equal current divi-
dends plus future market values discounted by time and
state.
Note that, even if individuals have different
wealth, utility functions, and priors, in equilibrium the
market will insure that certain weighted integrals of
the time-state discount factors (linear combinations,
in the discrete-time case) will be equal for all indiv-
iduals. In the futures-market-equivalent case, when
there are as many independent assets as future states,
consumption will be adjusted so that
(2.7) ait(0t+l) = jt(0t+l)
for all (i,j) and all values of t+l1 This implies that
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gains from trade have been exhausted and the economy is
at an efficient point.
Let us. turn now to the consumer's work decision.
Recall that a worker has three options: 1). He may be
unemployed, earn zero, and live off lump sum transfers
and wealth. 2) He may work in the consumption goods
sector and earn wct. 3) He may work in the capital
goods sector and earn wkt. If he chooses to work in
a sector where he is not presently located, he incurs
real expense vt. There is no disutility to labor, but
the worker has a maximum labor endowment.
Since there is no disutility to labor, the worker
need only choose the option that yields the preferred
expected income stream. Obviously, initial employment
status of the worker makes a great deal of difference;
an unemployed worker is much more likely to move into
the capital goods sector, say, than is a worker who al-
ready has a job in the consumption goods sector. Look-
ing first at the unemployed or newly entering worker,
and using our time-state discount factor notation, we
can write the necessary conditions for the worker to be
indifferent among his options:
(.2.8) vt t+ l ( ) in
-Pt t +l
vct+l(et+l)) t+l
92
Wkt
vt t + et f at(t+l) min(vt+l,
Vk,t+l(t+l)) dot+l
where ,t+l(et+1 ) is the mobility cost at which an un-
employed worker would just be indifferent to entering
the consumption sector in period t+l, given 0t+l
.
(Vk t+l(t+l) is defined analogously.) This has the
interpretation that, at indifference, the current mo-
bility cost must be equal to the current real wage plus
expected mobility cost savings gained by moving now
rather than later. Note that the more "intuitive" con-
dition
w
(2.9) U'(ct)vt = U (ct) Pt
T w.
I a E(U'(ci ( e) ) I())
i=t+l Pi
which equates the present value of real wages to the
mobility cost, is true only if there is expected to be
positive unemployment in every future period.
The conditions under which an employed worker would
be indifferent between ;staying where he is and moving to
the other sector are the same as (2.8), except that real
wage differentials take the place of real wages.
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Firms in this economy are competitive, may be
either consumption or capital goods producers (though
they may never switch sectors), and have the same fixed-
coefficients technologies postulated for their respective
sectors in Part I. Because the technology is fixed-
coefficients, marginal productivities depend only on
the endowments of the sector as a whole; it does not
matter how the initial capital stock is distributed among
firms.
We assume the existence of a stock market but no
futures markets. Without futures markets profit max-
imization is not well-defined. We shall suppose that
firms instead maximize their current stock market value.
This implies that firms have knowledge of how the market
evaluates potential income streams; i.e., firms must
know some aggregate version of equation (2.5). Ten-
tatively we write down the firm's problem as
(2.10) max (Xt = Rt + o at( t+l)
It,Lt t+l
Xt+l( Ot+ ) d t+l)
where, recall, Xt is stock market value and Rt is net
dividend payments.
Before working with (2.10), we must make several
points:
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1) The expression at(Ot+l) is supposed to repre-
sent some market aggregate of the time-state discount
factors of individuals. However, except in the futures-
markets-equivalent case when there are as many indepen-
dent assets as states, the aggregate ats will be under-
identified (i.e., there are less integral restrictions
than states). We will assume that the firm picks any
set of ats consistent with existing restrictions.
2) We have not assumed the existence of a bond
market (although it would not be a great complication
to do so). Firms must therefore make purchases of new
capital out of current earnings, creating the possibility
of negative dividends. This is not a difficulty. With
perfect bonds markets, negative dividends are the same
as a combination of positive dividends and increased
firm debt (Modigliani-Miller). Without bonds markets,
there is no reason to restrict an offered income stream
to nonnegative components. We can therefore express
dividends as:
(2.11) (Consumer goods firms)
Rct = Pt min(KctLct) WctLct - Pkt ct
(2.12) (Capital goods firms)
Rkt = Pkt ' min(Kkt/a,'Lkt/b) 't -
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WktLkt - PktIkt '
3) In their maximization, competitive firms must
take the time-state discount factors they employ as
parameters. Specifically, a firm would not take into
account any change in the discount factor caused by the
firm's impact on aggregate consumption.
With these caveats, we replace Rt in (2.10) with
the expressions in (2.11) and (2.12), treat the ats as
constant, and maximize with respect to Lt and It. This
yields the necessary conditions for an interior solution:
(2.13) (Consumer goods firms)
Pkt = e a t(St+l) max(Pt l ( 9t+ l ) -t+l
Wc,t+l(St+l)0) + Pk,t+l(Ot+l)) d t+l
, Kct W t PLct pLct
o Wct > Pt
(2.14) (Capital goods firms)
1
Pkt = o I aCt(ot+l) (maX(a(Pk,t+l(St+l)'t+l 
Gt+l - bwkt+l(0t+l)),0) +
Pk,t+l (t+l)) dt+l
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*- K[kt Wkt Pkt'St
Lkt {Kkt 
0 Wkt > Pkt'et
Interior solutions equate the current price of cap-
ital to the time-state-discounted sum of next period's
return to capital and next period's capital price. Also,
an interior solution implies that expected marginal
returns to capital next period are equal in the two
sectors. This is not true' ex 'post or if investment takes
place only in one sector (corner solution).
We have calculated the optimizing behavior of
agents in a particular market economy. As one might
suspect, there is a strong duality between the con-
ditions we derived in this part and those derived for the
planned economy in Part I. It is interesting to ask when
those conditions will be identical so that the market
economy will duplicate the physical allocations of the
planned economy.
It turns out that there are two necessary conditions,
one of which is very close to assuming the futures-mar-
kets-equivalents case in the market economy. First, the
objective functions of the two economies must be com-
parable. Second, the aggregate time-state discount fac-
tors must be uniquely determined. We can get these con-
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ditions by assuming that everyone has. the same utility
function, the same consumption, and that. the utility
function is of the form
(2.15) UM(ct,mt) = U (ct/Lt) + wt(mt)
where UM is the consumer's utility function and UP is
the planner's objective function. These assumptions
are heroic, of course, especially because complicated
transfer payments are needed to give workers in different
sectors the same consumption. It is a worthwhile ex-
ercise, however, because with these assumptions and
some algebraic manipulation one can show the equi-
valence of the planner's necessary conditions (1.11) -
(1.14) to the market economy conditions (2.13), (2.14),
and (2.8). From the algebra we also get
U' (Ct)
(2.16) l = 
Pit t Pkt
U' (ct) U' (.ct+1 )
and 2t - Pt wt + E( Pt+l
min(vt+l,vt+l )) - U' (t)vt
which are market-oriented expressions for the planning
problem Lagrange multipliers associated with a unit of
capital or labor in period t.
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The market economy does not have to duplicate the
planned economy to be efficient. For efficiency we need
the time-state discount factors to be'unique. This is
virtually equivalent to the full futures market case.
In general, then, the market economy will contain in-
efficiencies.
Much needs to be said about the general equilibrium
properties of the market model, especially about the
determination of wages and prices, but I wish to defer
that. Instead, let us recall some of the interesting
properties of the planning model - notably, that it may
exhibit efficient excess capacity and unemployment.
By analogy of the necessary conditions, it is clear that
the market economy will behave similarly. Thus it
appears that we have a market economy model with 1)
inefficiencies, and 2) unemployment of resources, where
1) and 2) are separate phenomena. The inefficiencies
are due to the inability of agents to trade over all
future periods and contingencies. The resource unem-
ployment arises from speculation in the markets for cap-
ital and labor stocks. The latter phenomenon will be
present in even a completely efficient economy.
What forms will this speculative resource unemploy-
ment take? From the necessary conditions we see that
firms may add capital even in a period of excess capacity,
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both in anticipation of future opportunities and to beat
expected increases in capital goods prices. Similarly,
labor stocks may be held in reserve by firms. Workers
may speculatively choose unemployment either by enter-
ing a sector where there is currently no work, or by
remaining uncommitted while awaiting new information.
In general, each of the forms of efficient unemployment
discussed in the planning case has its market analogue.
We have given what is essentially an extended ex-
ample, in which hoarding and speculation that lead to
unutilized resources are given an efficiency justifi-
cation. This outcome is expected to be theoretically
robust, in the sense that it will follow from any econ-
omic model that obeys the broad and plausible descrip-
tion given in the introduction to this paper. The em-
pirical importance of these phenomena, on the other
hand, is not clear. These effects may possibly be
swamped by some other source of unemployment (i.e.,
Keynesian disequilibrium). Resolution of this is left
to future work.
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CHAPTER THREE
INCOMPLETE LABOR CONTRACTS, CAPITAL, AND THE SOURCES OF
UNEMPLOYMENT
Introduction
Recent years have seen the 'appearance' of a rela-
tively large number of theoretical papers on contract-
ing between economic agents. This literature received
its impetus from an influential reinterpretation of
Keynes, offered by Barro and Grossman (1971), Clower
(1965), and Leijonhufvud (1968), among others,' which
recast the traditional model into a theory of disequil-
ibrium (quantity-constrained) trading. The formulation
of Barro-Grossman''et' al. is appealing; it is, however,
tenable only in a world where prices and wages do not
adjust instantaneously to clear markets. This is some-
thing of a difficulty, as the persistent failure of
a market to clear implies that profitable opportunities
exist which are not being exploited. Contract theory
was a response to this problem; it has attempted to
resolve the difficulty by showing that, in a regime
where there is contracting, short-term opportunities
may rationally be foregone in the interest of longer-
term benefits.
Much of the contracting literature has concen-
trated on the labor market,. the market where the oc-
currence of serious and persistent disequilibria seems
most credible. Most of these papers, though not all,
102
as we shall see, have appealed to the risk-sharing
motive for contracting, Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974),
D. Gordon (1974), and Grossman (1975) have argued that
labor contracts are preferred to spot markets because
they allow employers to sell income insurance to
(more risk-averse) employees. The contract form that
provides the preferred insurance, they claim, is one
that keeps wages fixed and varies employment. This is
supposed to explain sticky wages and, consequently, the
failure of the labor market to clear. The contracts
that have these effects, moreover, need not be formal
agreements; the contracts may be impl'icit, a part of
the accepted way of doing business.
The "implicit contracting" theory has not con-
vinced everyone. A counterargument to this and other
theories of non-Walrasian allocations induced by con-
tracts is offered by Barro (1977). Barro's idea may
be stated as follows: Any contract that is supposed to
be "optimal" must, a fortiori, provide for a Walrasian
allocation of labor services in the short run; i.e.,
the marginal value of labor's product must equal the
marginal value of leisure foregone. If this is not
the case, ex post negotiations could make both parties
better off. The claim of optimality for fixed-wage
contracts, for instance, must be flawed (in this view),
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unless provisions for' ex post employment adjustments are
included. This is approximately true. even if there are
costs of ex post adjustment; it would still pay both
parties to eliminate large deviations from the Walrasian
solution.
The present paper is an attempt to reconcile these
two positions and to relate labor contracting and the
apparent disequilibrium phenomena observed in the labor
market. Our approach is as follows. We concede to
Barro the point that no fully optimal contract could
produce a non-Walrasian allocation of labor (this is
virtually by definition). However, we suggest that
real-world labor contracts may be "incomplete", i.e.,
they may face exogenous restrictions on their form
or content. Because certain contract provisions are
not available (just as certain markets are "missing"
in the classic Arrow-Debreu framework), real-world
contracts are of a "second-best" nature. One result
may be non-Walrasian labor allocations. The incomplete
contracting framework allows a pinpointing of the dif-
ferences in assumptions that cause Barro and the con-
tract theorists to reach opposing conclusions.
Beyond clarification of the contracting debate,
the incomplete contracting device is of independent
use in analyzing unemployment in the labor market.
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We show first that, under a certain type of contract
incompleteness, the coexistence of a positive wage
and involuntary unemployment need not imply that there
are unexploited private opportunities for arbitrage.
Further, the inclusion of incomplete contracts in a
model with capital and variable utilization rates
reveals that there are many forms of unemployment -
some efficient, some inefficient - consistent with
perfect information and zero unexploited private op-
portunities.
The paper is in two parts.
Part I studies contracting in the labor market.
The distinction between complete and incomplete con-
tracts is motivated and used to discuss the contracting
debate. A simple model demonstrates how, with incom-
plete contracts, a positive wage can persist in the
face of involuntary unemployment.
Part II introduces a capital stock with a fixed-
proportions technology and variable utilization rates.
It is shown that there are numerous potential sources
of unemployment, even within a given sector, that are
consistent with rational behavior.
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I. Complete and Incomplete Labor Contracts
We begin our discussion of labor market contracting
by asking what form an ideal contracting instrument
would take. We propose the following minimum pro-
perties: The ideal contract must 1) be enforceable upon
both parties, 2) admit of any type of transaction, and
3) dictate a well-defined outcome (or procedure) for
every distinguishable state of nature. A contract that
has these properties we will call a' complete contract.
One justification for setting the complete contract
up as a standard is that, in a labor market with com-
petition on both sides and complete contracts, a Wal-
rasian allocation of labor will be enforced in every
period and state; else, more profitable contracts would
be available. The existence of complete contracts is
sufficient (though not necessary) for Barro's view to
be correct.
If contracts are complete, then they merely form
a "veil" under which an essentially Walrasian result
obtains. However, there is reason to think that real
contracts, especially in the labor market, are incom-
plete, i.e., they lack one or more of the above pro-
perties. Incompleteness stems from exogenous restric-
tions on the form or content of the contract; the
analogy is to "missing markets" in the Arrow-Debreu
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model. Some possible sources of contract incomplete-
ness are listed below,
1) Because of prohibitions agains slavery or
indenture, and because of difficulties in setting a
legal standard of worker compliance, labor contracts
are typically not fully enforceable on workers. This
incompleteness causes observed contracts to differ from
the idealized model in several ways. Contracts must
be structured to make voluntary compliance attractive.
This may involve staggering benefits towards the end
of the working life (through seniority rules, for ex-
ample), setting up artifical barriers to mobility, or
giving workers firm-specific training which is not
easily used elsewhere. Such provisions may be ineffi-
cient. The magnitude of inefficiency will depend,
among other things, on the presence of natural worker
mobility costs. If mobility costs are sufficiently
high, nonenforceability is not a problem.
We note that, even if there are no mobility costs,
the nonenforceability restriction does not reduce
contracts to the spot market case. Firms may still
desire to offer one-way contracts, which bind the firm
but not the worker. The advantage of one-way contracts
is that, by allowing the firm to make a commitment to
deliver certain benefits in the future, some gains
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from trade not available in the auction market may
be realized, For example, a firm-owner with a high
discount rate, by committing himself to give greater
benefits than other firms in the future, can reduce
his current labor costs and increase his utility.
The firm-owner with a low discount rate is not helped
by a one-way contract; he cannot offer higher benefits
now in exchange for low benefits later, since he cannot
bind his workers to stay with him in the later period.
2) Law, custom, union practices, etc., do not
permit certain transactions between employers and in-
dividual workers. An outstanding example of this is
minimum wage laws. Other examples include health and
safety regulations, insurance and pension rules, stat-
utory work weeks. While such arrangements are probably
desirable on net, they do act to set a lower bound on
the effective "wage offer" of a potential new worker.
Thus, some employer-worker matches desired by both
parties are prevented.
3) A third contract incompleteness stems from
asymmetrical or incomplete information about states
of nature. Information gaps may introduce moral haz-
ard or adverse selection problems that make a fully
contingent contract impractical. Hall and Lillien
(1977) have made a study of this situation. They
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suggest that information failure is an important deter-
minant of the form that contracts actually take.
When there are potential moral hazard problems
on both the supply and demand sides, say. Hall and Lillien,
a fully efficient contract is impossible. As a second-
best measure, to increase short-run efficiency in the
use of labor, real labor contracts provide for the
"internalization" by one party, .usually the firm, of
both the costs and benefits of variations in labor
hours. A typical contracting pattern is as follows:
Periodic negotiations between the workers and the firm
establish 1) a base level of compensation, B, and 2)
a supply-of-labor-to-the-firm function, V(x). As
business conditions change, the firm is allowed to vary
the number of labor hours required (x) unilaterally.
However, the labor supply.function has the property
that, no matter how many labor hours are required,
workers always receive just enough compensation to
keep them indifferent between their current compensation-
hours package and the base level of compe-n:sation, B.
This arrangement makes sure that the firm's labor-hours
decision will, if profits are maximized, equate the
marginal product and marginal disutility of labor (as
embodied in V(.)). If labor supply shocks are small
relative to those affecting productivity or the demand
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for output, then short-run allocative efficiency is
realized. Note that the firm has no incentive to l.ie
about its true demand for labor, as workers have no
incentive to lie about their supply curve.' Occasional
renegotiation shifts the base compensation level, to
keep it in line with current supply conditions in the
economy.
We have suggested three ways in which real labor
contracts may be incomplete, relative to an ideal con-
tract; we do not pretend that this short list is
complete. The problems that prevent the realization
of the complete contract are of a nature similar to
those that make the economy as a whole different from
the Arrow-Debreu ideal: enforcement difficulties,
institutional constraints, informational asymmetries,
transactions costs. As in the case of missing markets,
traders who must use incomplete contracts search for
institutional.or other arrangements in order to achieve
the best possible allocation.
The incomplete contracting model can provide a
framework in which to study the contracting debate.
If we want to think of decision makers as rational and
efficient, the benefit of the doubt must be given to
Barro: Agents in the labor market will try to use
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contracts to achieve Walrasian allocations of labor.
.Writers who. claim that optimal contracts are responsible
for non-Walrasian allocations must show two things:
First, that there are plausible reasons for assuming
the agents are restricted away from complete contracts
in a certain way. Second, that within the 'restricted
class agents are permitted to use, the optimal contract
leads to a non-Walrasian allocation of labor.
Let us see how the implicit contracting theorists
fare under these criteria. The class of possible
contracts they allow is a small one - those in which
compensation is linear in labor hours (i.e., there
is a fixed hourly wage). Other methods of compensation
- e.g., lump-sums, or payments nonlinear in hours -
are not considered. These writers satisfy our second
criterion by proving fixed-wage-variable-employment
theorems about the class of contracts they admit.
However, they do not justify their severe restriction
on contract form (first criterion). This is important,
as their whole argument rests on the necessity of using
one instrument (the wage) to perform two functions
(risk-sharing and labor allocation). It is not clear
why contracts must be so limited.
In contrast, Hall and Lillien are explicit about
why they restrict the class of contracts they consider
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(informational asymmetries, moral hazard),.fulfilling
our first condition. Their discussion of the optimal
contract within that class (second criterion) is non-
rigorous, but (to us anyway) still plausible.
We will try to meet the two criteria ourselves
in the next section, when we argue for a non-Walrasian
result due to incomplete contracting.
Con'tracts' and an' apparent' labor' market disequ'ilibrium.
In this section we will show that some of the forms
of contract incompleteness described above can create
a situation that looks like excess supply in the labor
market. This apparent disequilibrium is really an
equilibrium, however, as there are no unexploited
opportunities for private profit to motivate its
elimination.
We will introduce a simple model in which there
are two types of workers, "trained" and "untrained".
By "trained" we mean something broader than "having
acquired a certain set of technical skills." We will
think of a trained worker in this model as one who is
experienced in the primary labor market; who knows the
rules and customs of the workplace; who has demonstrated
the ability to.show up on time, follow instructions,
etc. An untrained worker is to be thought of as a new
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entrant or secondary market worker who may have (let
us say) the same native ability as a trained worker,
but is without primary market experience'
The following assumptions form the model:
1) Trained workers are each affiliated with. a
specific firm. Untrained workers make up a central
pool.
2) The output of a trained worker in period i
is Xi. Xi follows a random walk over time. The pro-
ductivity of an untrained worker is normalized to zero.
3) An initial investment of D is required to
"train" an untrained worker and bring him to a firm,
An initial cost of d is needed to move 'a trained worker
from one firm to another. Assume 0 < d < D,
The difference in costs D-d includes not only the
costs of imparting technical skills on the job but also
the costs of social adjustment and of "screening" (the
cost imposed when a certain fraction of previously in-
experienced workers turn out to be unacceptable), We
make the crucial (but realistic) assumption that the
firm must undertake at least some of the additional
training required by a new worker. This is equivalent
to assuming that, by such devices as diplomas, a new
We can bound Xi away from zero by assuming that Xi=a
implies Xi+l=a, where a is a small positive number.
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worker on his own initiative cannot make himself a per-
fect substitute for an experienced worker.
4) Contracts are incomplete in that a) workers
cannot bind themselves to
more than one period; and
wage of zero. We assume t
provision b) is effective.
not in general allowed to
educational and productive
ition" from new workers.
look only like an evasion
be thwarted by the limited
workers to
ships does
the worker
work.
stay with a given firm for
b) there is a legal minimum
hat the zero minimum wage of
In particular, firms are
set themselves up as joint
enterprises, accepting "tu-
In most cases, such a plan would
of the wage law; it might also
access of secondary or new
capital markets. The existence of apprentice-
not contravene our assumption, as long as
does not actually pay the firm in order to
5) Firms operate in a competitive labor market
for a fixed number of workers. New firms have free
entry. Firms maximize the present discounted value
of their expected profits, where is the common discount
factor. Workers maximize the present discounted value
of their expected wages, with an arbitrary (within the
unit interval) discount factor.
The truth of this assumption is apparent to any reader
of help-wanted ads.
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We wi-sh 'to find labor market. equilibr.ium .for this
model. Let wt(X) be the wage paid a trained worker
when X is the current level of productivity, Since
one can always get a trained worker from another firm
by paying his mobility cost .(d) and a wage infinites-
imally higher than wt , competition ensures. that
(1.1)
co d= '(E~~X0 " (X)- wt (0)d = t. i (E(xi-W (Xi)) = -B
i=0
which implies
(1.2) wt (X) = X - (l-B)d
The first-period wage for an untrained worker,
wU (x), satisfies
(1.3) D = (X0- w u(X0)) + I- (XOW (X0 ))
0- o a 
~-w
so that
(1.4) wU(X)w (x) = X - D + Ed
Alternatively,
(1.5)
(1.4) can be written
w (X) = wt(X) + (l-)d - D + d
= wt(X) + (d-D)
(1.5) shows that there is a wage differential between
trained and untrained workers' 'in' each p'e'r'iod equal to
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the difference in training costs. The full difference
must be made up in a single period because workers
cannot bind themselves to stay with a given firm for
more than one period.
It is possible for X to take values such that
wt(X) > 0, wU(X) < 0. This will happen if
(1.6) (l-B)d < X < D- d
When X is in this range, the non-negativity restriction
on wages implies that no untrained workers will be hired.
Trained workers will be kept on at wage wt > 0 X
falls in this range with greater likelihood the larger
is D and the smaller is d. Since X is a random walk,
a drawing of Xi in this range implies a relatively
high probability that Xi+l will also satisfy (1,6).
This situation has all the characteristics of
excess supply in the labor market, There is a pool
of unemployed workers who, no matter what their dis-
count rate, would be willing to work at a starting wage
of zero. Workers already on the job are being paid a
positive wage. Nevertheless, no untrained workers are
hired, and there is no tendency for the wages paid to
firm-affiliated workers to fall. Given the restrictions
on contractual arrangements, no profitable opportunities
are being left unexploited. This apparent disequilibrium
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(it is, in fact, an equilibrium) will persist until a
drawing of X falls outside the bounds of (1,6).
The problem in this market is that only starting
wages - rather than lifetime wages - can move to clear
the market for entering workers. The new worker cannot
offer a lower lifetime wage than those already em-
ployed because he cannot bind himself indefinitely
to a specific firm. Because the starting wage must
be non-negative (or above some minimum), it may not
be able to go low enough to clear the market for new
workers. At the same time that new workers cannot
find a job at zero wage, old workers (who have training
costs already sunk in them) are being paid a positive
wage to keep them from defecting to other firms.
The restriction that makes this model work is
the assumption that workers cannot provide all of their
own "training" or, alternatively, pay the firm for
training by taking a negative wage. Without this
restriction, workers would bear all training costs
and the externality would be eliminated. However,
given our broad definition of "training" (perhaps
"experience" would be a better word), we feel our
assumptions are credible.
If one accepts this model, it provides an interest-
ing appendix to the contracting debate. We have shown
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a non-Walrasian outcome in the labor market which is
due not to contracts but (in some sense) to the absence
of contracts (the unavailability of certain contracting
provisions). Moreover, the non-Walrasian result occurs
not in the allocation of labor of workers already
affiliated with a firm (this is where previous writers
have concentrated their efforts), but in the market
for workers that no one has yet hired.
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II. Sources of Unemployment - a Model with Capital and
Contracting
The original purpose of the contracting literature
was to explain the coexistence in the labor market
of 1) unemployment and 2) prevailing wages above the
reservation levels of the unemployed, without relying
on the existence of unexploited profit opportunities.
In this section we put incomplete contracts into a
model with capital to show that there are many sources
of such unemployment, even within a given sector.
Our model assumes neither imperfect information nor
constraints on sales; these are neglected not because
they are unimportant, but because their implications
for unemployment have already been studied elsewhere.
The nature of production in our model is simple
and formally restrictive: we assume a fixed-coeffici-
ents input relation between the services of capital
and labor. This is not the same as a fixed relation
between stocks, as we permit the utilization rates
of capital and labor to vary independently. Limited
This model complements the analysis of the last Chapter,
which showed how unemployment of resources can occur
because of differential development between sectors.
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capital-labor substitution ex post is, we feel, a
realistic description of actual technologies; moreover,
it is required for excess capacity to be consistent
with optimization. In this paper we also impose lim-
ited substitution ex ante. This is only for simplicity
and has no important qualitative bearing on the re-
sults.
We look at an economy in which a single output
good is produced by identical firms. We write the
production function for period t:
(2.1) yt = min(KSt,LSt)
i.e., the production function is fixed-coefficients
in services. KSt and LSt are the capital services
and labor services, respectively, used by the firm
in period t: units have been normalized so that the
factor ratio is one. We will assume that the output
good, yt, can either be consumed directly or trans-
formed by the firm into durable capital; more on this
shortly.
Services of an input are equal to the stock of
the input times its utilization rate:
(2.2) KSt = Kt ' Xkt
LSt = Lt Xlt
120
where
0 <Xkt -1
0 Xlt <1
Kt and Lt, the number of machines owned and the number
of people employed by the firm, are fixed in the short
run. xkt and Xlt, the fraction of the day the machine
or worker is engaged in production, are firm decision
variables. For a cost-minimizing firm, xkt and xlt
will be related in the short run by
(2.3) xkt = Lt/Kt ' Xlt
Thus a firm with one shovel and two workers, if it
wants to use its workers eight hours a day (Xlt =
.333), will have to keep its shovel in use sixteen
hours a day (xkt = .667).
Let us now consider the relation of the firm and
its workers. In a given period, t, the firm has Lt
employees on its roster. There is an incomplete labor
contract of the type described in the last section:
i.e., the contract is legally binding only on the firm;
and it is of the Hall-Lillien form. Because it is
a Hall-Lillien contract, compensation is made to depend
on hours worked in such a way as to give employees
the same basic utility level no matter how many labor
-I ,
hours are required by the firm. The base utility level
is renegotiated each period and depends on the quality
of worker alternatives. The (one-way) contract may
be thought of as being either one period or many per-
iods in length. The one-period contract is essentially
the spot market case; here the base utility level must
be at least as great as in the workers' best alter-
natives, net of mobility costs. In the multi-period
case, the firm has succeeded in binding itself to
deliver at least certain levels of utility to its
workers in later periods; here the current base utility
need not be as high as in the workers' alternatives, if
workers value future provisions of the contract suf-
ficiently highly.
The model includes both the single- and multi-
period cases. In either situation there will be a
current labor compensation function of the form
V1(Xlt'St )
which, for any labor utilization rate xlt and state
of nature st, gives the quantity of goods required
to keep the worker at his base utility level, U(st).
If there is a positive utility to leisure, then aVl/ax
> O; if there is diminishing marginal utility to lei-
sure, 2Vl/axl > .
1 )
An example of a compensation function is in order.
Suppose workers have the current utility function
U = ln(y t) + ln(l-xlt)
where yt is the quantity of goods received by the worker
and xlt is the labor utilization rate. A base utility
level, U, has been negotiated. Then y = exp(U) is
the level of compensation required to attain the base
utility level when labor hours are zero. For a fixed
state of nature we want a labor compensation function,
cd
V1 (Xlt), such that
U= ln(Vd (x)) + ln(l-xlt)
that is, utility is constant at the base level for
any degree of labor utilization xlt. Exponentiating
cdboth sides and solving for V1 , we have
Vcd ( exp()) lt 1-
In this, the Cobb-Douglas case, the firm must pay y
in period t just to keep workers with the firm, even
if they are temporarily laid off (Xlt = 0); otherwise
the workers would change firms and would not be avail-
able for recall. Note that dV d/dxlt > d2 dx2t > 0,d1 xt 0,c /dxit > 
and V approaches infinity as labor time required
1 9
approaches twenty-four hours a day (Xlt = 1).
Compensation of incumbent workers, we see, depends
on labor market conditions and the nature of existing
contracts. We must also specify how new workers are
hired, i.e., how the firm expands its stock of labor,
L. We shall treat labor as a quasi-fixed factor of
production (see Oi (1962)). As in the last section,
we assume that there is a certain fixed cost, D, that
must be borne by the firm in order to bring a new
worker "online". D may be thought of a real hiring
and training costs and may have both general and firm-
specific components.
The firm employs capital services as well as labor
services. Recall that capital services are the product
of the firm's stock of machines, Kt, and its capacity
utilization rate, xkt. In the short run Kt is fixed,
but xkt may be varied. We postulate a (real) per-
machine operating-and-maintenance cost function
Vk(xkt, st
whose arguments are the capacity utilization rate and
the state of nature. Total O&M costs increase with
utilization, so aVk/axkt > 0. Marginal costs also
increase with utilization (maintenance is more dif-
ficult, inferior equipment is pressed into service);
we take 2Vk/ax4t > 0. The Vk function is analogous
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to the V1 function derived for labor utilization.
The state of nature appears as an argument for Vk not
only to represent technical unknowns like machine
reliability but to capture unspecified market phen-
omena like changes in the real cost of fuel or replace-
ment parts.
Between periods the firm can expand its capital
stock. It does this by transforming some of its own
previous-period output into machines at rate Pk' which,
for simplicity, we will take as being technologically
given and constant. A firm's capital stock is non-
depreciating, bolted down, and cannot be transformed
back into the output good.
We have now specified all uses for the output
good, which allows us to write down the income iden-
tity. For each firm:
f(2.4) yt c + V(xltst)Lt + Vk(Xktst)Kt +
PkIkt + D Ilt
where
f
ct = consumption by owners of the firm
in period t (profits)
Ikt = additions to the capital stock in
period t
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Ilt = additions to the labor stock in
period t
and
Pk
0
D
? if Ikt
if Ikt
, if Ilt
> 0
< 0
< 0
Statics.
of this model.
Let us analyze the short-run properties
Within a single period, t, the firm's
input stocks (Kt,Lt), its utilization cost functions
(Vk,Vl), and the current state of nature, st, are
given. All that needs to be determined is the current
level of output, yt.
The factor utilization rates necessary to produce
a given yt are:
(2.5)
Xkt = Yt /Kt
Total cost is
(2.6)
thus given by:
TC(t) = Vl(Yt/Ltst)Lt + Vk(Yt/Ktst)Kt
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Iif I t
xit = Yt /Lt
Differentiating with respect to yt to obtain the mar-
ginal cost function and setting this equal to one (the
"price" of Yt the numeraire good) yields optimal
output yt as an implicit function of the parameters:
(2.7) aVl/axl(yt/Ltst) + Vk/axk(yt/Ktst) = 1 
For an example of short-run output determination
we turn again to the Cobb-Douglas case. We have already
derived a labor compensation function for a worker with
Cobb-Doublas utility:
V1 (XltSt) = (s)/(l-xlt)
Symmetrically, suppose per-machine operating costs are
given by:
Vk (Xkt st) = g(s)/(l-xkt)
Then, using (2.7), output yt is implicitly defined
by:
Y /(l-yt/Lt) + g/(l-Yt/Kt ) = 1
Let us imagine for a moment that this firm has access
to an unlimited and costless supply of labor services.
Then the labor cost term is zero, and yt for this example
can be written as
yt (1-g½)Kt
127
Note that output and labor services employed are finite
here, even when labor supply is costless and infinite.
Moreover, if g > 0, there will be unused capital capa-
*
city, despite the costless labor supply. These two
propositions are frequently true of this class of
technologies, in the short run.
Dynamics. We have so far not specified the agent
objective functions in this model economy. To do
dynamics, we must be more explicit. We assume that
there are no futures or contingency markets. Hence,
profit maximization is not well defined. One way to
characterize firm behavior in this situation is to
develop a stock market story; this is the approach
taken in Chapter 2. Here let us assume that there
are two classes of identical individuals: firm-owners
and workers. Firm-owners (there is one owner per firm)
have intertemporal expected utility functions
T i-t (2.8) U = E( i-t U(c))
i=t
where, from (2.4) and (2.5)
(2.9) c y. - * 
-(29) i Vl(yi/Lisi)Li - Vk(Yi/Ki'si)K
- PkIki - D Ili
If g 1, the machines use up more than they produce,
and Yt = 0.
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and
(2,10) Iki i= -Kl i
Ili = Li+l Li
That is, the firm-owner's utility depends on his con-
sumption, cf , in each period and state of nature.
That consumption is the production of his firm, less
current payments for capital and labor services, less
outlays for increasing the stocks of capital and labor.
Worker utility functions enter only through the
form of the V1 (labor compensation) function, so they
are not set out explicitly. We assume that workers
do not save or invest, but consume all of their current
compensation. Firm-owners are able to save by increasing
their input stocks. Money is excluded from the model.
The firm-owner's optimizing problem is to maximize
(2.8) with respect to (2.9) and (2.10). His choice
variables are Iki and Ili, his planned additions to
his input stocks; yi, his optimal level of current
output, is already given by (2.7). For an interior
solution, the two necessary conditions for an optimal
path are:
(2.11) (Investment in capital stock)
U'(c)Pk = E(BU'(ci+l){aVk/axk(Xk)xk -
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Vk(Xk) + k} )
(2.12) (Investment in labor stock)
U'(c)D = E(SU'(ci+l){V 1 /axl(xl)xl -
V1(x1) + D } )
where
(2.13) xk =Yi+/Ki+l
X1 = Yi+l/Li+l
Parenthesized objects in (2.11) and (2.12) are arg-
uments of functions; braces indicate multiplication.
Expectations are with respect to information available
in period i. Note that the envelope theorem allows
us to ignore the effect of small changes in Ki+l and
Li+l on optimal output, Yi+l-
The decision to increase input stocks is seen
to hinge on three considerations: 1) the cost of stock
increments (Pk,D), relative to current consumption;
2) the effect of the increment on next-period production
costs (the terms in V and V'); 3) the long-term value
of the increment, given future plans (pk,D ).
The first factor does not require much analysis.
The real investment costs, Pk and D, are exogenously
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fixed and are the 'same in all periods. Cet'eris paribus,
then, investment will be low 'in periods of low current
production (because'the marginal utility of consumption
is higher in those periods). Observe 'that this leads
to a serial correlation of investment levels even when
the underlying stochastic disturbances are 'independent
over time; low production and investment this period
means lower-than-trend production next period, there-
fore lower-than-trend investment. ("Investment", re-
call, means hiring and training new workers as well
as adding to capital.)
The second factor considered is next-period pro-
duction costs. In either the capital or labor cases,
the production cost savings due to an increase in input
stock can be written as
*av * V*(2.14) x -(x ,s) - V(x*,s)
ax
The first term represents a positive saving, arising
from the fact that a higher stock allows for a lower
average utilization rate and, therefore, lower oper-
ating cost/labor compensation expenses per unit of
stock. The second term is negative (a cost dissaving);
it occurs because a factor stock increment increases
the number of units that require current expenditure.
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Since one term is positive and one negative, we have
the possibility that increased input stocks might raise
production costs. Let us examine this with our Cobb-
Douglas example.
Once more, let Vcd = y (l), Vk = g(l-xk)
The cost of producing some given output y is
(W /(l-y/L))L + (g/(l-y/k))K
Minimizing this total cost expression with respect
to L and K is done by setting the marginal cost-savings
expressions, x aV/ax - V, equal to zero. This gives
(y/L) (y /(-y/L)) - W/(l-y/L) = 
and a similar expression for capital. As long as costs
are nonzero, the solutions do not depend directly on
-w
y or g:
L = K = 2y
or
xl = y/L = 1/2
Xk = y/K = 1/2
The general expression for the optimal utilization rate
is x = V(x )/(3V/3x(x )).
In this example the firm-owner will, other things
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being equal, adjust his capital and labor stocks so
as to keep utilization rates close to one-half. Current
deviations of x from 1/2 will occur because of dynamic
considerations, however - a topic we now consider.
We look at the final element of the stock increment
decision - its long-term value, contingent on future
plans. The necessary conditions suggest that the long-f cterm values can be expressed as U'(c+l)p or U'(+D ,
which can be viewed as the savings in future investment
gained by undertaking investment now. A more illum-
inating way to examine this is as follows: Imagine a
firm-owner in period t who has solved his stochastic
dynamic programming problem for periods t = 1,...,T.
This gives him the future optimal values of his invest-
ment in capital and labor, contingent on current in-
vestment decisions and the contemporaneous state of
nature. Denoting optimal values with an asterisk, we
write:
(2.15) Iki = Iki(Iktlit's i)
li = Ili (Ikt, Ilt'S i)
(Initial conditions, Kt, Lt, and st are taken as fixed.)
The firm-owner's optimization problem in period t is
to maximize (2.8) subject to
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(2. 16) Yt Yt - V(Yt/Ltst)L - V k(yt/Kt'st)K
- PkIkt - DIlt
f Ci+ l t+ - Vl(Yt+/Lt+Ilt)st+l)(Lt+Ilt)
- Vk(Yt+l/ (Kt+Ikt) st+1) (Kt+kt)
- PkIk,t+l - DIlt+l
and
f. L.i-i .f .C= Yi - V (Yi/ (L+Ilt+j I+l
+' I
{ (Lt+Ilt + Ilj ) }-
. i-i
Vk ( Y i /(Kt+Ikt + L Ikj) i).j=t+l i
{(Kt+Ikt+ Ikj) }- PkIki - DI1i
for i = t+2,...,T
Solving the maximization problem, we can again take
repeated advantage of the envelope theorem, which
allows us to think of y , I1, and Ik as fixed for small
changes in Ilt and Ikt. For an interior solution in
period t, we have the conditions
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(2.17) U'(ct)pk E (ct+ xkt+ (xk,t+st+l
Vk(Xk, t+l)} +
si-tu' (ci) Xkiaxk Vk )
Y i 'ciX k
(2.18) U'(ct)D = ESU' (ct+{x l x V 1
+ I.i-tu, (c 1i) Xliax 
where
(2.19) Xkt+l Yt+l/(Kt+Ikt)
Xki = yi (Kt+Ikt+ Ikj)
Xl,t+l = Yt+I/(Lt+It)
Xli = Yi (LtIlt+ j Ilj)j=t+l
i = t+2,...,T
and the arguments of V are omitted after the first in-
stance.
The interpretation of these conditions is as
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follows. Suppose the firm-owner is considering making
a small (positive) change in his current input stock
investment plans. Because of the envelope theorem,
he can examine the effects of this infinitesimal change
while taking his future production and investment plans
as fixed. The left-hand sides of the above expressions
are the costs of the proposed change; the right-hand
sides, the benefits. The costs of increasing current
investment are the marginal utilities of consumption
foregone. The benefits are the sum of future pro-
duction cost savings, appropriately weighted by marginal
utilities and the discount factor. The interior solu-
tion equates the costs and benefits of capital or
labor stock investment.
Let us note two facts. First, marginal benefits
to current investment in either input are diminishing,
and typically go to zero for a large enough investment.
Positive cost savings are possible only so long as
the factor utilization rates are above their optimal
values. The marginal cost savings possible diminish
as the utilization rates decline (i.e., as stocks
expand) and become negative if the stock becomes so
large that utilization rates fall below the optima.
Second, the marginal benefits to current invest-
ment depend on all future labor compensation and cap-
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ital operating costs, in the following way. 'A decline
(say) in expected compensation or operating .co'sts for
some period in the'future, call it t, increases -the
expected optimal output for that period. for any given
level of input stocks, The 'increase in the utilization
rate in t' increases the marginal value'of input stocks
in t', and, therefore, the marginal. value'of investment
in the initial period, t. In general, current invest-
ment in either capital or labor stocks. bears an inverse
relation to future costs of labor compensation or
capital operation.
We can now see the "dynamic considerations" that
thwart the firm-owner in his ideal of always maintaining
optimal utilization rates. First, reaching the optimal
stocks may require too great a sacrifice of consumption
in the short term. Second, if current production costs
do not move smoothly over time, no smooth 'growth 'path
of stocks will always yield the optimal utilization rate,
Instead, firm-owners may have to carry excess stocks
when costs are high in order to have them available'in
periods when costs are low.
Sources 'of unemployment. The model we 'have analyzed
can by used to identify sources of unemployment in
a given sector.
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Note first that this model can produce unemploy-
ment of labor resources in two distinct ways: through
a low current labor utilization rate, xlt, or through
a low stock of firm-affiliated labor, Lt
A low utilization rate may be interpreted. var-
iously as "short hours" or as "layoffs with recall".
In this model, given input stocks, costs, and demand,
- and, also given the assumption that shocks to the labor
supply curve can be neglected, - labor utilization within
the firm is Walrasian. This is because of the Hall-
Lillien provision that insures equality of the marginal
product and marginal disutility of labor for the workers
covered by the contract.
The sources of layoffs are current changes in 1)
the value of the output good, 2) marginal operating costs
of capital, 3) costs of materials and other variable
inputs, and 4) the opportunity cost of leisure Of
these, changes in the value of the output good are prob-
ably most important empirically, at least over the cycle.
The other factors may be important secularly. For
example, the work week has declined steadily with increa-
ses in the opportunity costs of working, while the oil
shock may have permanently lowered utilization rates (at
least for workers using the current vintage of capital).
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The other form of labor resources. unemployment
predicted by the model occurs when Lt, the number of
workers who are firm-affiliated, is less than the'
total available labor force. Our analysis has shown
that the rate of increase of Lt depends on three sets
of factors:
1) The cost of creating new jobs relative to current
levels of consumption. Sometimes, given social discount
rates, the capital stock cannot increase fast enough to
employ a growing labor force. (This argument requires a
lower bound on the ex ante capital-labor ratio.) This may
frequently be the case in developing economies; there is
insufficient surplus for the number of manufacturing jobs
to keep pace with labor supply.
This type of unemployment is much less likely in a
developed economy; we expect that sufficient savings will
be available to match the capital stock to the labor force.
It is possible, however, that the recent unemployment
experience of the United States is partly attributable to
the short-term inability of the economy to absorb a
substantial spurt in labor supply growth.
2) The impact of additional workers on short-run
production costs. When the firm-owner puts new workers
on the roster, he is incurring fixed costs in order to
reduce his variable costs. Steeply increasing variable
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costs (e.g,, high overtime charges) motivate additional
hires. Large. fixed costs (for example, if training is
expensive, or if laid-off workers still receive a large
part of their base pay) reduce the number of workers put
on the payroll.
The degree of risk-aversion in the firm-owner's
single-period utility function affects this tradeoff.
If the dominant stochastic factor in the environment is
changes in produce demand, for example, more risk-averse
awners will maintain smaller labor forces in the short
run. This has the advantage of creating higher labor
costs in high-utilization states and lower labor costs
in low-utilization states relative to the large-labor-
force firm, leaving the risk-averse owner a smaller
variance of new consumption.
3) The long-term value of an additional worker,
given future plans. The decision to expand the labor
force instead of increasing utilization rates depends
critically on the expected long-run situation, If stu-
dent enrollments are secularly declining, for example,
the school board would rather pay overtime to the exist-
ing staff than hire and train new teachers. Similarly,
an upward trend in real energy prices promises lower
future utilization rates, leading to lower optimal em-
ployment today. The magnitude of these. effects depends
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in part on the firm-owner's discount rate (his willing-
ness to trade tomorrow's costs for today's.)
In general, both temporary and secular shifts in
costs and in the demand for output keep capital and
labor stocks "mismatched" in the short run. As stocks
are adjusted to reflect average long-run needs, the
short run will be characterized by alternating periods
of high utilization and stock hoarding.
We see that even a relatively simple model yields
a variety of sources of labor unemployment. Many of
the types of unemployment we have analyzed would, in
the real world. find their way into the national sta-
tistics, perhaps to be thought of as "disequilibrium" in
the labor market. This, of course, is largely a
problem with the way unemployment statistics are collect-
ed. The deeper questions are: How much of this unem-
ployment would be perceived as "involuntary" by workers
in the market? And what is the role of contracting
in perceived disequilibrium?
It will be useful to separate the effects of contract
incompleteness, as described in Part I, from the other
sources of unemployment. Suppose that contracts are
complete, in that workers can accept negative wages and
bind themselves to stay with a specific firm. In this
circumstance both principal types of unemployment of
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labor resources would still exist. The difference would
be that any worker willing to undertake the co sts of
training (either directly or by paying the firm)' could
find a job. Walrasian allocations would result, both'
within the firm's internal labor market and in the
market for new workers.
Despite this outcome, it is possible that workers
might (erroneously) report that there is a disequilibrium
in the labor market. It is true, for example, that a
new worker will not be able to find a job by offering
to work for a wage'marginally below that of someone
already employed. The already-employed worker's wage
includes a return to the equity h.e holds in his own
training. Since that training may not involve a diplo-
ma but rather (say) a knowledge of the firm's inventory,
the unemployed worker may think of himself as identical
to the fellow already in the job. He will feel "in-
voluntarily unemployed" if his reservation wage is near
the wage received by the employed worker.
If contracts are incomplete, the perception of
labor market disequilibrium becomes more acute. As
shown in Part I, the prospective entrant's, starting wage
offer must undercut the wage of experienced workers by
the full differential .cost of training. 'The entrant
may in fact have'no positive wage'offer that would get
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him a job, even though employed workers are paid a
positive wage. This would almost surely be. construed
as a disequilibrium. This situation is non-Walrasian
and inefficient; however, it is not, as we have seen,
a true disequilibrium, in that there are no unexploited
opportunities which will tend to change the outcome.
We offer two conclusions. 1) With respect to the
"contracting debate": Under any circumstances, the labor
market is likely to experience unemployment, which may
be perceived as involuntary. (Equivalently, wages will
be thought to be "sticky".) If contracts are incomplete,
allocations may be inefficient, Explanations of these
phenomena, however, need not rely on "persistent dis-
equilibria", or failure of the private sector to exploit
opportunities. Labor contracting can be absolved from
the claim that it "causes" serially correlated unem-
ployment.
2) As a matter of policy-making, a fixed unemploy-
ment rate is probably not a good target for the economy
as a whole to shoot for. Other research has already made
this point (for example, the search literature). This
paper has given reasons why the optimal work-leisure
split may vary over time in a given sector. The pre-
vious Chapter discussed still other sources of variable
(but efficient) utilization of resources. We conclude
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that there is no prima facie case for forcing the unem-
ployment rate to stay in a narrow range.
While the appropriate goals of policy that affect
the aggregate unemployment rate are not clear, manpower
policy should be active. To the extent that contracts
are incomplete, worker training has characteristics
of a public good, and should therefore be subsidized.
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